



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**ÉGALITÉ OU RÉALITÉ:
WHERE DO MUSLIMS TRULY RESIDE IN TODAY'S
FRANCE?**

by

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June 2007

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2007	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Égalité ou Réalité: Where Do Muslims Truly Reside in Today's France?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael A Davis				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>In this study, the author focuses on France, exclusively, to illuminate the potential causes for material and/or ideological support to terror in that society, and further indicates how these trends may be evident or potential throughout Western societies. As in recent years, the word "Muslim" has become synonymous with terror in the daily lexica of France and other Western societies, this thesis demonstrates that terrorism is not a spontaneous or stand-alone problem. Terror and other forms of extremism in France—whether imminent or imagined—mark an end form of the true issue: social exclusion, or alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society's Republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity make no distinction for such identity factors as ethnicity and religion.</p> <p>This study focused on the French headscarf ban, with its goal of promoting integration. This thesis demonstrates that the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in French society was manifested as a challenge to French identity and the tradition of <i>laïcité</i>, or secularism. These ideas, and others central to French-ness, are seen in the French polity as threatening, as well as a visual representation to the threat posed by the influx of Muslim immigrants and their failure to assimilate.</p> <p>This thesis concludes by demonstrating that issues such as racism, Islamophobia, and social alienation or exclusion are the vehicles that radical Islamists prey upon to find potential <i>jihadists</i>. If the headscarf ban is politicized by the fundamental Muslim community, the ban ultimately might prove counterproductive resulting in reduced integration in public schools, more segregation, and a radicalized Muslim community hostile to the Western traditions that France holds so dear.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS France, Muslims, Integration, Stasi Commission, Laïcité, Islamophobia, Racism, French History, Contemporary French Culture.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 103	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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**ÉGALITÉ OU RÉALITÉ: WHERE DO MUSLIMS TRULY RESIDE IN
TODAY'S FRANCE?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

In this study, the author focuses on France, exclusively, to illuminate the potential causes for material and/or ideological support to terror in that society, and further indicates how these trends may be evident or potential throughout Western societies. As in recent years, the word “Muslim” has become synonymous with terror in the daily lexica of France and other Western societies, this thesis demonstrates that terrorism is not a spontaneous or stand-alone problem. Terror and other forms of extremism in France—whether imminent or imagined—mark an end form of the true issue: social exclusion, or alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society’s Republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity make no distinction for such identity factors as ethnicity and religion.

This study focused on the French headscarf ban, with its goal of promoting integration. This thesis demonstrates that the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in French society was manifested as a challenge to French identity and the tradition of *laïcité*, or secularism. These ideas, and others central to Frenchness, or *Françité*, are seen in the French polity as threatening, as well as a visual representation to the threat posed by the influx of Muslim immigrants and their failure to assimilate.

This thesis concludes by demonstrating that issues such as racism, Islamophobia, and social alienation or exclusion are the vehicles that radical Islamists prey upon to find potential *jihadists*. If the headscarf ban is politicized by the fundamental Muslim community, the ban ultimately might prove counterproductive resulting in reduced integration in public schools, more segregation, and a radicalized Muslim community hostile to the Western traditions that France holds so dear.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, my academic thanks go to Dr. “Uncle Donny” Abenheim, who berated and cared enough at the same time to teach me to stop dragging my knuckles and to observe all things through various lenses. Your mentorship and tutelage will always be remembered. Next, Dr. Zachary Shore, whose class on Muslims in Europe was an illuminating and enjoyable experience. Dr. Douglas Porch, who beat French history into me and forced me to create something I can truly be proud of. Dr. Carolyn Halladay, the world’s best editor, whose blend of scholarship and humor made “rewriting” enjoyable. I cannot thank her enough. For facilitating my research in Europe, I am gracious to LTC(R) Rich Hoffman and his Center for Contemporary Conflict, as well as Dr. Smith and the Institute for National Strategic Studies

My personal thanks to the JMU crew at NPS. Nut and KB, our workouts, races, brainstorming, and debates will always be a great memory of my time in Monterey. Your families (and their wonderful meals) and your friendship were invaluable support. Mac, our trips and skydiving soirées were great fun. Thank you for the camaraderie. Mom, you know you’re the best, and TJ, you’ll always be the best Dad.

I would also like to thank the U.S. Embassy Staff in Paris, specifically Stephen and Jeff Kulmayer, who not only helped me with my research, but inspired me to achieve more than a cursory glance at the surface of French society.

To my French instructors from the DLI, Christophe, Patrick, Ryan, Jose, Veronique, Michelle, et al., you taught me both the language and a love for France.

And last but not least, my dear FAO friends, the Scattinis and Martinellis. Your friendship, support, and counsel have been invaluable. I hope to return the favor some day.

To all, I hope to serve as your host and tour guide in Paris!

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I. INTRODUCTION

Are terrorists the product of a “social crisis”? As the collective assumptions of both the Western *vox populi* and leading policymakers in the United States and Europe increasingly link radicalized Muslims to global acts of terrorism, the question of how these terrorists are made gains urgency. Why *do* they hate us, a thoughtful Westerner might profitably ask, particularly of his fellow citizens who are embracing such destructive ideologies? What prompts people who may have grown up in, say, France or Britain to reject the fundamental tenets of pluralistic democracy in favor of annihilatory martyrdom? The answer often begins with a reference to a crisis in these very ideals, or at least in their execution, sufficient to discourage, if not to exclude, Muslims in the country from joining the national project. If the Muslim citizens of the West feel they have nothing to gain by integrating into Western society, then what do they have to lose by hastening its demise?

On February 14, 2007, the *Sous-Directorate Anti-Terroriste*, the Counterterrorist subdivision of the French national police, arrested eleven French citizens for recruiting volunteers willing to travel to Iraq in order to battle Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). Six of them were later charged with “criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist venture.” Three additional suspects were placed under formal investigation for financing international terrorism. These arrests revealed that since the summer of 2004, French authorities had been investigating groups of young Muslims who were attempting to join the *jihadi* in Iraq to fight MNF-I. Indeed, in 2004, MNF-I had killed three young, Muslim Frenchmen fighting north of Baghdad.¹

In late 2004, French authorities identified a French Muslim fighting MNF-I in Fallujah as the leader of an Iraqi armed group. These findings led French authorities to investigate and later dismantle three recruiting networks in Paris, Tours, and Montpellier. According to press reports, these networks were providing assistance to insurgents in

¹ Pascal Combelles-Siegel, “French Authorities Dismantle Network of Fighters Bound for Iraq.” *Terrorism Focus*, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume 4, Issue 3, February 27, 2007. <http://chechnya.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370261> (accessed February 27, 2007)

Iraq, while the Parisian network actively recruited and operated from the Mosque of Adda'Wa in the nineteenth arrondissement of Paris and from a *musalla*, or prayer hall, in the Parisian suburb of Levallois.

These arrests heightened French anxieties that a generation of Muslim youths is opting out of traditional French Republican values. The realization that some young French Muslim citizens are willing to abandon their lives in the Hexagon to fight the *jihad* in cities throughout Iraq is shocking to many French people. These citizens are sons of Muslim immigrants born in France. However, they identify not with the values that underpin the French Republic, but with the idea that the global Muslim community is suffering at the hands of the West in general and the United States in particular. Even more shocking to the French is the stark realization that these French Muslims who find their way to battlefields around the globe, are not all refugees from the desolate, Muslim dominated *banlieues*, or French ghettos. In fact, two of those arrested in February 2007 were university students studying technical fields.²

The French experience is being repeated throughout Europe. The tensions and trends within Muslim immigrant communities challenge traditional social practices and concepts of nationhood in Europe. European societies struggle to assimilate Muslim immigrants into traditional paradigms of nation, state, citizenship and religion. The participation of some Muslims in terrorist activities has become a security issue, which may only worsen with the growth of Europe's Muslim population and the perception of a "clash of civilizations," between Islam and the West. These issues are paramount for defense policymakers, especially as Islam has become a European religion, on that challenges traditional notions of nation, state, citizenship, and political ideas firmly rooted in modern Europe.

A. CASE STUDY SELECTION

In order to study the changing profile of Muslims in Europe, this author has reviewed information to identify the degree to which a European country has developed as a society of inclusion or exclusion, and then to determine the degree to which Muslims

² Combelles-Siegel, 2.

are successfully integrated into that society. While this problem of integration or assimilation affects much of Europe, this study will focus on France.

The Netherlands, Germany, and France have all passed legislation perceived as hostile to Muslim groups or communities within the society. As a result, citizens of minority ethnicities or religions, especially Muslims, feel alienated. Amongst these three countries, France is particularly interesting because of the historic imperial interplay between North Africa and Metropolitan France. France has, in recent years, enacted significant pieces of public law and immigration legislation that Muslims consider hostile. This legislation and the tension that it both reflects and creates have inspired voluminous media and academic attention, which form the basis of this study. Other European countries look to France as a model for Muslim integration, for better or worse. This thesis will deal with the debate on French identity and immigration by situating the contemporary discourse within its historical and cultural contexts. In order to understand better the issues of Muslim alienation within France, one must understand French history, to include the role of North Africa and North Africans, race relations, and Islam in modern French society.

The French ideal of *laïcité*, or secularism, is a bedrock of French Republican identity and a legacy of the Age of Reason and the Revolution. In 1989, that ideal was tested when a French headmaster expelled a Muslim student for wearing her headscarf in the classroom. In the subsequent litigation, which pitted *laïcité* against religious freedom, the courts, whose arguments primarily centered on which symbols were permissible, ruled that symbols were permitted so long as they were not worn or displayed with the goal of “pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda.”³

The terrorist bombings of 1995 in the Paris Metro as well as the events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, led to a rise of Islamophobia throughout the West.⁴ The perception that Muslims were invading France deepened

³ “Q & A: Muslim Headscarves.” <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoos/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3328277.stm> (accessed November 21, 2006)

⁴ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 58.

Republican fears that the foundational principles of French Republican identity were under siege. The headscarf, or *hijab*, became a symbol of a cultural clash.⁵ The public sentiment led the French President, Jacques Chirac, to establish an independent commission in January 2004 to research the modern interpretation of ideas and the implementation of contemporary secularism in French society, or “to reflect upon the modern application of *laïcité*.”⁶ After four months of testimonies and investigations, this commission, led by the French politician and former ombudsman of the French Republic Bernard Stasi, a first generation Frenchman of Mexican and Italian heritage, recommended twenty-five measures to the French leadership. President Chirac chose only one of these measures to take before the Parliament. On March 3, 2004, the French Senate approved the law “prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public elementary and secondary schools.”⁷ Polls at the time demonstrate that approximately 60 percent to 70 percent of the French population supported the ban.⁸

This thesis will assess the ban’s impact on the French, including France’s Muslim minority. In this connection, one must also explore:

- What does it mean to be “French,” and furthermore, how does being “French” pertain to questions of peace, security, and defense?
- How has the concept of citizenship and nationhood evolved in France?
- What developments have occurred within French society since the imposition of the ban?
- How do persons who feel victimized or segregated react within French society?

⁵ Jocelyn Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority.” www.libertysecurity.org/imprimer.php?id_article=234 (accessed November 21, 2006)

⁶ Patrick Weil, “A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims, and the Headscarf.” www.openDemocracy.net; (accessed November 23, 2006), 1.

⁷ Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 163.

⁸ “Q & A: Muslim Headscarves.”

- What are the broader implications of the French experience within Europe, and potentially within the United States, and how might the US experience, conversely be of benefit to French society?

The importance of this topic and its relevance to the issues of politics, society, and security will have utility for policymakers within the U.S. Department of State and U.S. European Command as they advise and assist European countries and even, perhaps, cooperate with the European Union in matters of vital, mutual interest. At present, Europe struggles to assimilate growing Muslim immigrant populations, as well as to prepare for European Union expansion into Southeastern Europe, which encompasses Bosnia with its significant Muslim population. There remains additionally, and the possible entrance of the first European Muslim country, Turkey. The question of Muslim assimilation affects all levels of European governance, as communities as small as hamlets and as large as the European Union are and will continue to develop policies that strive to promote fair and equitable immigration as well as successful integration of immigrant populations. These policies must meet the challenge of “Old European” nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant racism. The findings and recommendations in this thesis may have further application for additional research into controlling the rise of ideological support to terror as well as spontaneous terrorism within both Europe and the United States.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Nationalism, “Frenchness,” and Immigration

The evolution of nationalism is a focus of much current scholarship about Europe.⁹ Hagen Schulze and John Breuilly highlight the scholarly literature on the evolution of state, society, and nation in modern Europe.¹⁰ The literature on French

⁹ One compilation of a series of essays that encompass the ideas, emotions, and events that helped shaped the image of Frenchmen is Hans Kohn’s, *Making of the Modern French Mind*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955).

¹⁰ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

nationalism is broad and covers all facets of society, politics, economy, and mentality to include the writings of Voltaire, the emergence of French as a national language, the “rebirth” of French pride under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, and the leading works of French history.¹¹ UCLA Professor Eugen Weber’s outstanding *Peasants into Frenchmen* focuses on the transformation of rural life in the face of the modernizing and nationalizing forces in the Third Republic. Unfortunately, the scope of this account of the modernization of rural France during the late eighteenth and nineteenth century fails to incorporate the period during and following the Second World War.¹² A study of the “Dark Years,” or those long fifty months between 1940 and 1944, when the German occupation extinguished the famous lights of *la cité lumière* and temporarily eclipsed French *grandeur*, reveals another aspect of the French nation, as does *les trente glorieuses* of French post-war recovery. These years matter signally to the state of Muslim citizenship today.

During the winter of 1940-1941, the inhabitants of occupied France faced national hardships. These Frenchmen were forced to cope with the constant hunt for fuel and food. With unemployment at more than 1.1 million and the oppression and deportation of French Jews and French workers to Germany with the collusion of the Vichy government, the French nation found itself humiliated and its proud culture abased. The French self-image transitioned from world power to victim at the hands of German aggression. The idea of victimization was promoted in the popular mind as members of the French Resistance defended French pride by refusing to accept German occupation.¹³ The June 1944 Allied invasion accelerated a campaign of German atrocities aimed at destroying the French Resistance and its supporters at Tulle and Oradour-sur-Glane. Adolf Hitler insisted—fortunately in vain—that Paris “should go down with him and his Thousand Year Reich.”¹⁴

¹¹ Works include but are not limited solely to Roger Price’s *A Concise History of France* and Simon Serfaty’s *France, DeGaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent*. See Bibliography for more literature on French history.

¹² Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976).

¹³ Alistair Horne, *La Belle France: A Short History*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 353-362.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 368.

On August 26, 1944, de Gaulle marched down the Champs Elysees in his uniform to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier amid thousands of cheering Frenchmen.¹⁵ With each step, de Gaulle reflected his vision of France—“The glories of the past were associated with today’s,” he stated as he continued to walk proudly through Paris despite shots being fired as he approached the cathedral of Notre Dame. De Gaulle believed in the fortune of France, and began his campaign of national revival almost immediately—a campaign based on his ability to rally his people around their shared hardships and collective memories.¹⁶

After having resigned in 1946, Charles de Gaulle returned to the presidency in 1958 to continue his interrupted rescue of “French ascendancy.” During de Gaulle’s tenure, many of the modern ideas of what it means to be truly French were cemented into the French populace. During these years (1958-1973), the Fifth French Republic again began to feel as if it had regained its previous *grandeur*.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the Fifth Republic nurtured other problems within French society.

France’s colonial aspirations spanned the globe during its centuries of preeminence. However, France established only one significant French colony of settlement after the fall of Quebec in 1759: Algeria. Because Algeria was considered an integral part of Metropolitan France, Paris faced the dilemma of how to integrate nine million Muslims. The end of the Algerian War in 1962 seemed to resolve this problem. By shedding the burden of an overwhelming Muslim province, de Gaulle, in effect, affirmed the vision of France as a “European nation, racially white, culturally Greek and Latin, and religiously Christian.”¹⁸ Unfortunately, this idea, while rooted in traditional French society, presently made it difficult for France to adapt to profound changes occurring within the Hexagon and throughout Europe. Although Algeria was no longer

¹⁵ Horne, 373.

¹⁶ Ibid., 374-375.

¹⁷ One of the most insightful accounts of this period is Philip Cerny’s *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy*. Another history that demonstrates the life of Charles de Gaulle in its entirety is Bernard Ledwidge’s history, *De Gaulle*. This lengthy biography demonstrates how de Gaulle developed his views and love of France.

¹⁸ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*. (London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 76.

French, North African Muslims continued to immigrate to Europe. (Before this period, France, despite its history of immigration, had yet to face a sizeable, drastically different population that challenged the fundamentals premises of French identity.)

The subject of Muslims, immigration, and integration in Europe has attracted a growing scholarship in previous years.¹⁹ Significant Muslim immigration in France began in the 1920s. The French government allowed “Algerians,” members of the French empire since the 1830s, to enter France as an extension of the country’s gratitude to the Algerian soldiers who had fought valiantly on behalf of the French during World War I. This migratory process expanded after World War II, when the European Community required guest workers to facilitate the reconstruction of European countries. France specifically broadened immigration to North Africans even as it waged a brutal counter-guerilla campaign in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. These Muslims came to France for two primary reasons: a minority were *harkis*, Muslim Algerians who had fought for France between 1954 and 1962 and were no longer welcome in an independent Algeria; a second, far larger group, came in search of work.²⁰

2. Scholars of the Stasi Commission and Related Debate

The French government’s decision to ban the wearing of headscarves in public schools has generated a great deal of debate among both scholars and journalists. The first group includes Western scholars who have studied Islam and immigration, among them the French scholars Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel, as well as Jonathon Laurence and Jocelyne Cesari. These scholars focused their attention on the debate between integration and assimilation as well as the successes and failures of various European governments to facilitate inter-racial and social convergence.²¹ Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist of Syrian descent, focuses on how Muslims can become productive members of

¹⁹ Works include “Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany” and countless journal and historical accounts of the history of North African migration into France. See Bibliography.

²⁰ Christopher Caldwell, “Allah Mode.” *The Weekly Standard*, Volume 007, Issue 42, July 15, 2002, 2.

²¹ Like Roy and Kepel, Laurence and Cesari are renowned scholars with numerous publications in the subject of Muslims and Western Europe. See Bibliography for the works by these authors utilized for this paper.

European societies. However, unlike other European scholars, Tibi argues that Muslims can become part of their adopted societies while maintaining their cultural and historical linkages. The clear distinction between integration and assimilation sets Tibi apart from his European contemporaries who demand social amalgamation, even when this means a loss of former cultural identities.²² All of these scholars, however, use their articles to divide French society into its various subcultures in order to explain the causes of the ban and its anticipated effects. Still, they have failed to follow up on the impact of the implementation of the ban.

3. “Sensational” Works

The debate over the headscarf ban has generated a vibrant popular literature written by journalists.²³ These sources, which are more widely available throughout the West, provide useful insights but tend to be sensational, if not alarmist. These works focus more on the justifications for a ban and less on the effects that ban would have on integration and assimilation of immigrants. These authors draw attention to the most dramatic aspects of the Muslim population in Europe: crime, unemployment, Muslim fundamentalism, female genital mutilation, “forced” marriages, etc.²⁴

The works of the Muslim feminists may be said to comprise a third category in the genre. Irshad Manji and Ayaan Hirsi Ali portray the plight of Muslim women in a more extreme light than either Buruma or Bawer.²⁵ These Muslim women, like their male contemporaries, argue that Muslim women encounter grave injustices in their predominantly-Muslim, immigrant communities and demonstrate how those inequalities, prejudices, and even crimes are in direct conflict with Western and European ideals and

²² Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics*. (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

²³ This phenomenon has been observed by this author and was also referenced by Jonathon Laurence and Justin Vaisse during their interview with Phillip Gordon at the Brookings Institute in September 2006. See Bibliography for more information regarding these two authors and/or the aforementioned interview as well as lurid titles such as *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* and *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*.

²⁴ Both the Buruma book and the Bawer book referenced in the preceding footnote are popular examples of this phenomenon.

²⁵ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam*. (New York: Free Press, 2006); and Irshad Manji, *The Trouble With Islam Today*. (Canada: Random House, 2003).

social conventions.²⁶ The thrust of this literature is that Muslim women in the West deserve the same women's rights as their Western sisters, and that Western leaders can, an indeed must, facilitate change.²⁷

C. THE MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT

This study will attempt to explore what has happened since the law was enacted and how the ensuing societal circumstances have evolved into radicalism, disaffection, or terrorist designs among French Muslims. The aforementioned authors demonstrate how Muslims arrive in Europe, how Europeans receive them, and how well those Muslims have integrated or assimilated inside their new countries, as well as the causes of these successes or failures. Unfortunately, the search for literature on the post-Stasi situation reveals a response that runs the gamut from academic to polemical. This paper will attempt to demonstrate the "ground truth" as it is found in the suburbs of cities such as Paris and Lille. I will accomplish this with empirical data from surveys conducted within France since the imposition of the law,²⁸ collusion of statistics of school attendance and private school enrollments, as well as through the incorporation of anecdotal, corroborating evidence gained from the results of interviews and questionnaires with E.U. officials, French immigration officers, French social workers, embassy staff members in Paris, Muslim organizations in France, and French citizens, both native French and Muslim immigrants.

D. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This study will discuss many terms that require definition, not the least of which is, what is a Muslim? In modern media and political parlance, Muslims are seen as a

²⁶ Claire Berlinski's, *Menace in Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis is America's, Too*. (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), is one example of a work that travels the same vein as Baruma and Bawer, yet highlights further the significant chasms between Western ideals and Muslim societies within Western countries.

²⁷ Fadela Amara, *Breaking the Silence: French Women's Voices from the Ghetto*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006).

²⁸ Detailed, quantifiable data was available from the recent Pew Survey and Rand Study by Cheryl Benard. Anecdotal evidence will be noted throughout this document.

group, the newest of Europe's ethnicities. Unfortunately, this is misleading because the homogenization and stereotyping of Muslims, as any "outsider" group, often provokes collective fear.

Like Christianity, Islam comes in many forms that often reflect very different cultural nuances. For example, Muslims from Indonesia distinguish themselves from Muslims in the Middle East. These cultural distinctions might be as slight as pronunciation of key Muslim terms or as vast as the Central African insistence upon female genital mutilation (FGM) for young daughters. Thus, it is evident that the religious practices of Muslims, and therefore the concept of Islam itself, are not monolithic. However, for the purposes of this study, the author will refer to the Muslim community in France as a single entity. This is primarily because the origin of the preponderance of French Muslims is North Africa generally, and Algeria specifically. Additionally, the majority of surveys conducted categorize Muslims as a single entity, even though there are significant regional differences in Algeria, as well as significant differences between the Arab and Berber racial sects within Algeria.

The terms "assimilation" and "integration" will also be used throughout this thesis. Although both terms generally refer to the amalgamation of parts into a whole, the delineation of these two terms will be crucial to our understanding of the current social dynamics and policies in France and throughout Europe. For the purposes of this thesis, integration will refer to the combination of races and peoples within a given society. Those being integrated will retain their existing cultural and/or religious identity in the new context of their adopted society. Assimilation also refers to a grouping of persons into a larger society; however, unlike integration, assimilation, as a process, generates a new identity for those being assimilated. The basic divergence between the two terms is a variation in retaining an existing identity or adopting the identity of the new society.

Racism will also be a key factor to this research. Although "race" is a biological category, it is as much a political and social construct that will be discussed in this research. In modern, Western societies, the term "race" precisely captures the socioeconomic status, culture, and genes of a given group of persons. Race-conscious

societies, such as those found in France, the United States, and most Western nations, limit their prevention of racism, because it perpetuates the ideas of differences between races. Three significant levels of racism exist within French and most Western societies: institutionalized, personally mediated, and internalized. Institutionalized racism is defined as differential access, based on race, to the goods, services, and opportunities within a given society. Personally mediated racism is simply prejudice and discrimination against a group of people. Prejudice manifests itself in assumptions about the group at issue, while discrimination is marked by differential actions towards that group. Last, internalized racism is an acceptance by those stigmatized that they or their peers are lesser persons and/or have lower intrinsic worth.²⁹

E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will examine the Stasi Law and its impact on Muslims within French society. Using the Congruence Procedure, this study will demonstrate how the law has created new, or exasperated existing social cleavages.³⁰ In order to demonstrate this congruence I will highlight the causal effect within various segments of society. The methodology for this will consist of five chapters. The Introduction will focus on the foundation of the debate including the differences between integration and assimilation, the various manifestations of racism, and why France was chosen as a case study. Chapter II, “What Does It Mean To Be French?,” will focus on the history of French nationalism and the evolution of secularism in France through the Second World War and that conflicts’ immediate aftermath. Chapter III, “*Les Musulmans*,” will highlight the change in French identity during the post-World War II decades, focusing on the war in Algeria and its effects, as well as the history of Muslim immigration to France; it then investigates why many French Muslim women seek to wear headscarves in France. Chapter IV, “Integration or Segregation?,” will concentrate on the origins, deliberations and recommendations of the Stasi Commission, and more importantly, the results of the

²⁹ Camara Phyllis Jones, “Levels of Racism: A Theoretical Framework and a Gardener’s Tale,” *American Journal of Public Health*, August 2000, Vol. 90, No. 8, <http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/90/8/1212> (accessed January 25, 2007)

³⁰ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1997), 58-59.

subsequent legislation. The study will draw on empirical data since 2003. This data will include statistics on school enrollment, as well as findings from large E.U., Rand, and Pew Surveys. Additionally it will include evidence taken from interviews with French citizens from various backgrounds, religions, ethnicities, and economic statuses carried out by the author. Chapter V, or the Conclusion, will suggest the consequences of these actions if they continue on their present track. The conclusion will also draw on the Process Tracing Method to propose that aggravated social cleavage may lead to terror or the promotion of terror.³¹ The final chapter will conclude with recommendations for E.U. and U.S. policy makers to broaden the efforts to integrate the Western world's growing Muslim community.

³¹ Van Evera, 64-67.

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II. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE FRENCH?

A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea. To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more—these are the essential conditions for being a people...

—Ernest Renan, March 1882, the Sorbonne, Paris, France.

The key to understanding the problem of Muslim integration in France, and its most symbolic struggle—the presence of the *hijab* in French schools—is to understand what it means to be French. Can a Frenchwoman wear a Muslim headscarf and still count as French? What cultural and social expectations attend the French national project? Where does a French-speaking Northern African Muslim, however observant, fit into the French self-image? While France encompasses regional, religious, and even cultural diversity, at its core lie specific sets of beliefs, values, and a common historical experience that might be said to define “Frenchness.” “Frenchness” sets France apart from other European nations, even while it is firmly anchored in European culture and history. This idea of a unique French identity shapes domestic politics. To participate in “Frenchness,” immigrant groups must be prepared to forfeit their native identities and conform to the ideals and values of the French Republic.³²

Frenchness as defined by a modern *citoyen* of France would include a strong sense of history as a long and torturous process that has bestowed both grandeur and tragedy on the country, but which, at the same time, has created and sustained a coherent, recognizable cultural identity. Beneath any apparent political division lies this

³² A detailed study of nationalism as it pertains to the various countries of Europe and France specifically can be illuminated with a review of Hagen Schulze’s, *States, Nations, and Nationalism*. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); John Breuilly’s *Nationalism and the State*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Gérard Noiriel’s, *The French Melting Pot*. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Philip Gordon’s, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Rod Kedward’s *France and the French: A Modern History*. (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2005); Hans Kohn’s, *Making of the Modern French Mind*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955); as well as Lucien Romier’s, *A History of France*. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1964).

fundamental cultural identity, which resides in the inculcation of shared national values and a sense of common interests and counterbalances both the centrifugal tendencies of pluralism and the personal interests of the individual *citoyen*. A similar discussion with a Briton or a German might reveal a comparable sense of national identity; however, France is singular in that its identity is deeply rooted in the Revolutionary and Republican tradition of the country, which is where this chapter necessarily begins.³³ This study seeks to describe how French identity was formed out of a collection of differing peoples and languages in geographical proximity from the Revolutions of 1789 through 1871, to the Third Republic. Finally, this chapter will explore the impacts of World War II and its aftermath. This historical review will highlight key ideas and events from the French past that contributed to the creation of a defined French identity, oftentimes referred to in contemporary language as *Françité*, or Frenchness.

A. UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL IDENTITY

Republican values, secularism, and language form key components of national identity that are transmitted primarily through the educational system. They form the foundation of French nationalism. French nationalism can be traced through five distinct periods beginning with the medieval era and culminating with the Algerian conflict and its repercussions in the latter half of the twentieth century. This chapter will focus on the development of French identity through the first four of these periods, ending with World War II. This account begins with feudal France, discussing society, religion, and the state's subsequent role in conjunction with religion. The French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century brought the feudal period to a bloody end, but it also witnessed the formulation of a secular, Republican strain of French identity and the propagation of French-inspired values as "universal," applicable to all societies throughout Europe. Although French power steadily declined with the fall of Napoleon in 1815, French identity continued to develop through the industrialization and modernization of the Third Republic. The Second World War put new strains on the French self-image, but it

³³Peter Fritzsche's, *Germans into Nazis*. (Boston, Harvard University Press, 1998) and Linda Colley's *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*. (New Haven: Connecticut, 1992) demonstrate the ideas of German and British nationalism, respectively.

also advanced Frenchness as a workable concept in the post-war world order. Taken together, the first four periods encompass the creation and formulation of the ideas of “White France.”³⁴ In the process, France was able to forge a national identity out of diverse and, at times, competing political and religious values.

Nationalism has sometimes been described as the secular religion of the Industrial Age.³⁵ That is to say, the industrialization of a society broke down regional barriers that contributed to changes in society, economy, and ideas. The sources of traditions in France shape the French idea of nation and self today. At the onset, the French state consisted of the church and the crown. France’s limited idea of nation was, as Hagen Schulze defined it, “that nation as a system of estates or an aristocratic hierarchy.” This nation’s roots were in the feudal system, but the emerging post-medieval state was intended to be permanent, with an authority that would endure beyond particular individuals.³⁶

The aftermath of the Hundred Years War in the fifteenth century, which led to the expulsion of the English from the Continent, distorted the earlier growth patterns.³⁷ The need for new development and economic growth facilitated the emplacement of four revenue districts in the state. This bureaucratic development led to the establishment of a corps of civil servants, who would manage this state as well as coordinate and channel the power of the church.³⁸ The historian Roger Price, of the University of Wales attributed the origins of a French sense of “being different from other peoples” to the

³⁴ White France is a term used throughout modern literature. This term has many meanings. To some it is the racial way of saying that France is a Catholic country founded by white men, while to others, White France is merely a description of the France of the period prior to significant African migration into the Hexagon during the twentieth century. Still others use the term to strike contrast between the continental European French Republic and African France, that is to say, those colonies and departments of imperial France whose citizens immigrate to France.

³⁵ The French artist, Jean-Louis David, painted the idea of the secular religion of nation. See Linda Colley’s *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992), 215

³⁶ Schulze, 9.

³⁷ Roger Price, *A Concise History of France*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 143.

³⁸ Schulze, 37.

period immediately following the Hundred Years War.³⁹ The relative control of the church over the state—and vice-versa—was challenged during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; these revolutions were not strictly religious, however. The upheaval of these periods not only altered faith and church relative to society, but also shaped the formation of France with a central state focused on the court versus the nobles and the feudal estates.⁴⁰

Religion had held sway over the French countryside for centuries. The Catholics and Calvinists engaged in a series of bloody religious wars in the late 1500s, with religious zealots committing atrocities on both sides.⁴¹ These wars of religion were brought to a close in April 1598 by the Edict of Nantes, in which Henri IV consolidated peace by “separating religious and political obedience. France set an unprecedented example of religious toleration, then a strange notion in all other states, both Protestant and Catholic.”⁴² This novel idea, coupled with Henri IV’s conversion to Catholicism, formed the solution to the ubiquitous, consistent religious battles throughout the French countryside since the mid-sixteenth century. Despite Henri IV’s benevolent government and its postwar reconstruction efforts, he was murdered by a religious zealot in 1610, precipitating a period of power struggles and the eventual autocratic rule of Louis XIV from 1661.⁴³

The intellectual justification of a strong monarchy that could ensure the peace is to be found in Jean Bodin’s *Six Livres de la République*, in which he argues in favor of a powerful government to establish the rule of law in a neutral and rational fashion.⁴⁴ Bodin’s theory contributed in part to the diminution of aristocratic controls and the concentration of power in the monarchy.⁴⁵ Under a monarchy that continued, with brief

³⁹ Price, 12.

⁴⁰ Schulze, 40.

⁴¹ Ibid., 45.

⁴² David H. Pinkney and G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, *History of France*. (Arlington Heights, Illinois: The Forum Press, 1983), 125.

⁴³ Pinkney and G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, 127, and 130-151.

⁴⁴ Schulze, 50.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 51.

interruptions, in one form or another until 1870, France remained a largely rural nation. The challenge of the Third Republic from 1871 was to mobilize the peasantry and transform them into citizens. Understanding how the peasants became part of the fabric of national life demonstrates the transition from peasants to citizens and patriots. The secular religion of nationalism thus developed alongside, and on occasion in opposition to, the Catholicism that was the religion of the majority of Frenchmen. Within this secular space of the day, as it were, competition enabled society to shed the bonds of a state-supported religion and was thus one of the first steps toward a French nation.

B. A WALK THROUGH HISTORY

1. The Revolution, the Rise of Napoleon, and Industrialization

If the French identity began to surface in the Hundred Years War, with the legend of the Maid of Orleans and her martyr's death as a result of English and Burgundian treachery, the French Revolution accelerated the process of creating a French identity by giving it a mass political foundation. Nationalism was born in the revolutionary period. Even so, the people of France formed a patchwork of languages with only the vaguest notions of what it meant to be French.

In the eighteenth century, many French elites, as well as those throughout Northern and Western Europe, prospered from overseas trade on the basis of mercantilism. However, limited local trade, poor communications, and high tariffs levied by governments and landowners, stymied economic integration.⁴⁶ In France, the predominant unit of production was the small workshop, and these artisans were subject to the restrictive regulations of the guild.⁴⁷ Until 1789, French society was organized as three estates: the clergy, the nobles or aristocrats, and the others. In France, the *noblesse* formed a less-closed estate, compared to other states in Europe. It was not a corporate body, and nobles were not debarred from all professions and trades. In fact, access into the ranks of nobility remained open to wealthy commoners through the purchase of

⁴⁶ George Rudé, "Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution," in *Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) 10-11.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

hereditary offices. The system of putting offices up for sale created, in the seventeenth century, a new and wealthy administrative nobility, the *noblesse de robe* (a reference to the official robes of office). This new nobility had begun to challenge the social status of the older *noblesse d'épée* (nobility of the sword). These older nobles both levied taxes and exempted themselves from taxation via the mechanism of hereditary privileges. This new order challenged the status quo by drawing “middle-class elites away from productive careers in agriculture, industry, and commerce.”⁴⁸

The high clergy, who were members of the nobility, enjoyed even greater privileges. As landowners, they not only received incomes from rents and feudal dues, they also received religious tithes (equaling approximately one-twelfth of the yield of land). They discharged their obligations to the Exchequer by the payment of a relatively small percentage of their income in the form of a *don gratuit*, or “voluntary gift.”⁴⁹ In response to these harsh, long-standing institutions, French peasants began to change in this period. Britain already was in transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, and France incorporated some of these sweeping reforms into the nationalization of her masses—a process accelerated and stylized by the Revolution.

The French Revolution was a complex event, with three catalysts. The first was intellectual agitation, drawing on the ideas of the Enlightenment, which sought a more rational and efficient organization of government and society. The emphasis fell on equality of rights and access vis-à-vis the state; old institutions and privileges were increasingly seen as incompatible with modern government and society. The writings of three French philosophers, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, were influential in shaping the intellectual environment of Revolutionary France and the world, although their viewpoints were very different. Montesquieu wrote from a conservative and aristocratic perspective, stressing the legal basis on which a just society was organized. Voltaire was critical of the inefficiencies of aristocratic France and the injustices this outmoded system fostered. Jean Jacques Rousseau was the most subversive with his calls for the sovereignty of the people. For Rousseau, like England's Thomas Hobbes and

⁴⁸ Pinkney and de Bertier de Sauvigny, 109-110.

⁴⁹ Rudé, 16.

John Locke, citizens chose to participate in a government, or enter into a “social contract” to protect themselves from the state of nature; however, Rousseau, unlike Montesquieu highlighted that the laws of that government would extend rights and/or obligations to all citizens for the overall common good of the society's members. Although Rousseau did not choose to depict the results of any disobedience to these laws in his work, he proposed various mechanisms to ascertain the "general will" within the society. The writings of these three Philosophes energized revolutionaries and gave them an intellectual focus that facilitated democratic and popular revolution.⁵⁰

The second contributing element of the Revolution was the bankruptcy of the French state.⁵¹ Taxation became especially onerous in this period of economic downturn. Prices had outstripped wages. In the first months of 1789, the price of wheat and bread increased by 50 percent, with no corresponding rise in wages.⁵² The amount of currency in circulation doubled as prices were forced up, while successive poor harvests reduced the availability of foodstuffs despite an increase in population. (The period from 1760 through 1780 saw an increase from 26.7 million to 27.5 million.)⁵³ The bitter cold and floods of 1787 and 1788 led to a catastrophic grape harvest, when as many as 3 million Frenchmen were relying upon a bountiful harvest to restore their standards of living. At the same time, the tax regimen continued unabated, with officials insisting on collecting taxes at levels from more plentiful days. The middle class and their peasant neighbors began to see themselves as victims of this system. The *taille*, *ventième*, *capitation* (head tax) and *gabelle* (salt tax) as well as countless other taxes on land were sources of discontent that fueled the Revolution. ⁵⁴ Social and economic relationships in France were changing. However, the government was ill adapted to accommodate these changes.

⁵⁰ Rudé, 35.

⁵¹ René Sédillot, *An Outline of French History*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 260-262.

⁵² Pinkney and G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, 206-207.

⁵³ Ibid., 189.

⁵⁴ Rudé, 24.

The proximate cause of the French Revolution—that is, the third and most immediate trigger—was social pressure. Pent-up tensions were brought to boil by an economic depression that created an excess of relatively well-educated or skilled artisans in competition for comparatively few jobs. In the spring and summer of 1789, the bankruptcy of the state unleashed a torrent of events. The dissolution and reformation of the Estates General in 1789 challenged the aristocratic organization of French society. The July 14th storming of the Bastille demonstrated with picturesque violence how French social crisis leads to political crisis, an idea that finds purchase today. Social and political change continued throughout the next years with the development of a constitutional monarchy in 1791. Henceforth the French monarchs swore allegiance to the constitution, thus changing the government from an absolute monarchy to a balance of power between the king and the “people,” based on a constitution. The advent of war in 1792 against the Habsburg Empire presented the fledgling French Republic with an opponent suffused in the structures and trappings of the *ancien régime* that France had just smashed at home. Frenchmen, collectively, could identify themselves as a nation against a foreign adversary—and they had an ideological mission, as well.⁵⁵

War broke on France as the Royal Army dissolved into mutiny and desertion, prompting the new Republican government to declare the *levée en masse*. This universal obligation of military service in support of the War of the First Coalition not only mobilized the French people, but also associated citizenship with the defense of the state. By 1793, France faced turmoil as the Republic was attacked from without and within. The Vatican foolishly supported the restoration of the monarchy, setting the stage for the church-state conflict, with all its present-day political import in France and the West.⁵⁶ This rift is apparent in two aspects of French identity. The traditionalists view Catholicism as integral to French history and reject as foreign, even heretical, such other Christian sects as Protestantism and Jansenism. They abhor Republicanism and its offshoot, Freemasonry, as the province of socialists, Protestants, and Jews—none of

⁵⁵ André Maurois, *A History of France*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956), 298-300.

⁵⁶ R.R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 101.

whom count as properly French. French Republicans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, on the other hand, saw the Church as repressive, encouraging rebellions of superstitious peasants in the Catholic west during the Revolution, and making alliances with foreign monarchs. (In more modern times, they see the Church as reactionary at best; at worst, it is an opponent of free speech and tolerance.) Therefore, from the first moments of modern French history, French values seem to pit liberty and freedom against tradition and order. For some years after 1789, the two parties and their worldviews seemed irreconcilable.

The Revolution was not over, and these conditions led to the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This military leader was viewed as a reactionary “man of order” by some, and as the perfect representative of Revolutionary and progressive ideals to others. Napoleon capitalized on the social upheaval and political crisis within his country to stage a *coup d’etat* that created an authoritarian government in November 1799 (and ultimately became the First Empire in 1804).⁵⁷

From 1799, Napoleon assumed the role of supreme leader of France. One of his first challenges was taming the Catholic Church. Historically, the church always rivaled—and in France, often eclipsed—the state for power and influence. Even the Bourbon monarchs were careful to promote their own candidates for high clerical office and to maintain the independence of the Gallican Church from the influences of Rome. Relations between the church and the First Republic were stormy, as Napoleon, himself a child of the eighteenth century and indifferent to religion, desired to harness the power of the Catholic revival in France to his own ends. Peace was restored only with the July 1801 Concordat with Pope Pius VII, through which the state regulated the practice of religion. That is to say, Napoleon’s pledged to the Pope that his government recognized the “Catholic, Apostolic and Roman” faith as the confession of a majority of Frenchmen and that the French government would assure the freedom of the people to exercise their faith publicly. As the historian Lucien Romier stated, “The Protestants, Calvinists, and

⁵⁷ Alfred Cobban, *A History of Modern France Volume 1: 1715-1799*. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1961) 250-251.

Lutherans in France received analogous advantages and submitted to similar discipline. Thus Bonaparte acquired the support of religion at the same time as he domesticated it.”⁵⁸

Meanwhile, Napoleon’s military victories reinforced French beliefs of *grandeur* that France was the world’s cultural and military leader. He led the victorious French forces—now a national army through the *levée en masse*—in the War of the Second Coalition, which ended with the Treaty of Luneville in February 1801, with the Austrians; and the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802, with the British. By the time of the War of the Third Coalition, the size and strength of Napoleon’s military forces overwhelmed his foes and spread the ideals of the French Revolution beyond the frontiers of France. Now the French state—and the nation of Frenchmen—were becoming ethnically and linguistically united. Moreover, Napoleon fused the state and nation, conceptually.⁵⁹ In the First Empire, military service, coupled with a series of resounding armed victories, forged this sense of national unity.

The Army became the chosen tool of the French government to promote the idea of the nation. Initially, the Army was often the government’s official census, conducting operations throughout France and collecting information on its inhabitants. In 1863, official French governmental studies demonstrated that 8,381 of France’s 37,510 communities did not speak French. Spoken French was actually a foreign language to a large portion of the population within the borders of France.⁶⁰ The governance of France was conducted in French, thus, the military operated in French. Operations within France often required translators, but more importantly, universal conscription would prove to be a vehicle of language dissemination. Service in the French military equated to learning

⁵⁸ Lucien Romier, *A History of France*. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1964), 355.

⁵⁹ The entire first chapter of Alfred Cobban’s *A History of Modern France Volume 2: 1799-1945*. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1961) details the military, social, and political exploits of the First Empire.

⁶⁰ Weber, 66.

the Republican values and the language.⁶¹ The Army became the “agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, civilization.”⁶²

This program of making France more thoroughly French was neither an accident nor an afterthought. As Eugen Weber explains in his work *Peasants into Frenchmen*, “Frenchness” was not inherited, and the idea of a nation with shared norms and culture did not come about spontaneously. These notions and attitudes had to be assiduously cultivated. Just as nascent national pride aided Napoleon in his military and political efforts, particularly among neighboring European populations, the momentum of the national revolution carried France through the tumultuous developments of the nineteenth century, not least because Frenchness was fostered. These decades saw the growth of industrialization and the results of that growth: increased middle class, urbanization, and education. This era also marked the consolidation of the unified, coherent French national identity.

For one thing, British ideas of industrialization and modernization reverberated in France, as entrepreneurs began to revolutionize French society and politics in their own fashion. The Industrial Age facilitated the growth of cities and an entrenchment of the growing middle class. The migration of peoples from farm to factory and the subsequent population explosion required improved transportation and communications.⁶³ “This growth of towns and trade would, sooner or later, disrupt the aristocratic society and whittle away its defense. The growing class of merchants and bankers increased by trade and financial operations, tended to become absorbed by it, or at least to come to terms with it rather than to offer any resolute challenge.”⁶⁴

For the most part, however, the French authored their own national agenda. The French government of the late nineteenth century diligently strove to eliminate the social fractionalization and regionalism that existed within the Hexagon. Regionalism was diminished with the creation of a transportation network and national media. The

⁶¹ Weber, 217.

⁶² Ibid., 302.

⁶³ Schulze, 139.

⁶⁴ Rudé, 19.

improvements of roads and the creation of rail facilitated a unified national market, as it permitted French peasants to venture beyond their villages, where they used to remain more attached to their local and regional identities than to some distant, Paris-focused French nation. The fear of outsiders, including the government, as well as the persistence of myriad dialects, were two manifestations of regionalism. Both of which made governance difficult and national unity questionable. The creation of modern lines of communication assisted the government in conducting regional assessments and implementing universal conscription.⁶⁵ (Additionally, peasants were required to communicate in French when conducting any business with the state or other Frenchmen, be it taxes, sales, or trade.)

Especially from the 1880s, the education system rivaled the army as the principal vehicle through which an often-illiterate peasantry was brought into the national mainstream. As with military service, when peasant children were required to attend school, they were inculcated with the values of the nation. French education centered on the idea that the past had to be rewritten. The creation of the national idea formed the cornerstone of French nationalism, beginning with a shared sense of a collective history. The schoolbooks of the Third Republic taught the foundations of Frenchness: “one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland.”⁶⁶ Just as roads and trails led to mobility and the spread of nationalist ideas and the state apparatus, the schools implanted these new beliefs in the future generations of Frenchmen. Like the French military, schooling was compulsory. The schoolteachers of the nineteenth century became the voice and ambassadors of the French Republic and also the “harbingers of enlightenment and of the Republican message that reconciled the benighted masses with a new world, superior in well-being and democracy.”⁶⁷

These schools also served as the heralds of secularism. As teachers shared the beliefs of the Enlightenment and its universal values, the role of rural myths and the place of the church in public life diminished. “The Church no longer symbolized the unity of

⁶⁵ Weber, 44-49.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 94.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 303.

all, but stood for the domination of one particular faction.”⁶⁸ In the event, the church and the state vied with each other to establish schools and win the loyalties of the population, a competition that culminated in the official separation of church and state in 1905. (Even very religious conservatives like Charles de Gaulle were forced to accept that the secular republic is the form of government that divides the French the least.) Equality became a basic tenet of the French identity, overcoming religion, regional affinities, and local languages.

2. World War II: Glory or Triumph?

The era of the Second World War in France, which began with the German invasion of 1940 and reached its nadir with the collusion of the Vichy regime with the Nazi occupiers, is often referred to as the “Dark Years.” Led by Marshal Pétain, the hero of Verdun, the conservative French government, capitulated to Hitler in the hopes of settling scores with their left-wing rivals, whom they blamed for the defeat. These conservatives believed that conspiring with the Nazis would serve as a prelude to regaining French *grandeur* in the postwar period. In 1941, the conservative Charles Maurras wrote in *La Seule France* (The Only France) that “the government of the Army offers us the shining image of French unity.” Maurras basked in the rule of Pétain, because he believed it offered France the opportunity to recover the *pays réel*, that is the “true France” uncorrupted by Republican ideas.⁶⁹

Catholic conservatives argued that the fall to the German invasion was punishment for the flawed final years of the Third Republic. These Frenchmen believed that France had been undermined by socialism, communism, and defeatism. Pétain, and those with whom he surrounded himself, believed they could “renew the True France of

⁶⁸ Weber, 360.

⁶⁹ Herman Lebovic, *True France: The Wars Over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 162.

their imaginations.”⁷⁰ This government’s collaboration, they believed, would allow them to focus on those traditional aspects that made their nation great: culture, language, religion, and so on.⁷¹

As the “capital” of unoccupied France until November 1942, Vichy had derisory powers and little influence.⁷² The *grand collaborateurs* believed that Hitler had, in fact, won the war, and thus, their collaboration would preserve France and its empire; therefore, allowing them to regenerate the nation in the postwar period. Life in the Occupied Zone became a struggle for most Frenchmen. The constant hunt for food and fuel, as well as the constant oppression by the occupiers, smacked of French failure, not renewal. In reality, capitulation and collusion with the invaders required acquiescence to the “inglorious episodes” that included mass deportations of Jews, as well as harnessing French industry and France’s workforce in support of the Nazi New Order. In the meantime, the Vichy police hunted down patriotic members of the Resistance.⁷³

Meanwhile, another French General, Charles de Gaulle, had escaped France and was building a government in exile in London. While de Gaulle shared Pétain’s conservative views, the two generals differed on strategy. De Gaulle believed that France was an exceptional nation. He, too, had fought valiantly for the nation during the First World War, and was prepared to lead his nation to victory, albeit in a different fashion than his counterparts at Vichy. De Gaulle proclaimed that “*La France ne peut pas être La France sans grandeur*,”⁷⁴ (France cannot be France without grandeur), or that France could not reclaim its world status by submitting itself to Germany. “As an adolescent I was convinced that France would have to go through gigantic trials,” de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs, “that the interest of life consisted in one day rendering her some signal service and that I would have the occasion to do so.”⁷⁵ De Gaulle became the voice of

⁷⁰ Lebovic, 171.

⁷¹ Ibid., 176-180.

⁷² Horne, 357.

⁷³ Price, 256-265.

⁷⁴ Charles de Gaulle, *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: The Call to Honor, 1940-1942*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 4.

the Free French. He encouraged Frenchmen around the French empire to retake their colonies from the Vichy regime. Inside France he took the leadership of an incipient resistance movement with the support of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). French resistance efforts gained strength during the war and the *Forces Françaises de l'Interieur* (FFI) became a potent arm of the opposition as well as the source of de Gaulle's wartime and post-war legitimacy.⁷⁶

On August 26, 1944, de Gaulle triumphantly returned to Paris to begin his campaign of rallying his people around their shared hardships and collective memories.⁷⁷ In de Gaulle's view, Vichy had defiled French honor. The reclamation of French honor and influence was crucial to de Gaulle's mission. "The country was moving forward; de Gaulle, as everybody knew, had triumphed in those war years, incarnating the essence of France with his refusal to collaborate. ... [H]is version of the war's aftermath—nothing of the country's murky collaborationist regime subsisted, and France had been reborn—was the accepted one."⁷⁸ Despite retiring from office in 1946, Charles de Gaulle returned to the presidency in 1958 to continue his interrupted rescue of "French ascendancy" from its state of collaboration and decline in world stature. During de Gaulle's tenure, many of the modern ideas of what it means to be truly French were cemented into the French populace. During these years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency (1958-1973), the French Republic again began to feel as if it had regained its previous *grandeur*.⁷⁹

Modern France and its fundamental ideas began with the French Revolution. These ideas, cemented in the Enlightenment concepts of man, reason, and the association of free men take their inspiration from Rousseau's *Contrat Social* and further with Ernst

⁷⁶ Horne, 364.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 374-375.

⁷⁸ Adam Nossiter, *The Algeria Hotel: France, Memory, and the Second World War*. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 5.

⁷⁹ One of the most insightful accounts of this period is Philip Cerny's *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Another history that demonstrates the life of Charles de Gaulle in its entirety is Bernard Ledwidge's history, *De Gaulle*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982). This lengthy biography demonstrates how de Gaulle developed his views and love of France.

Renan's "*Qu'est ce qu'une nation?*"⁸⁰ The French believe that their nation is founded in universal values as well as France's unique historical experience. The lessons that they take away from this historical experience are that religion is separate from the government; France deserves and maintains a particular *grandeur*; and the school system serves as the means to inculcate French social beliefs in successive generations of French citizens. These lessons form the framework for the current debate over the integration of Muslims into French society.

Being French is central to the French identity itself. It overcomes any other identity. For Frenchmen, the Republic equates to *citoyens*, each entitled to the same rights. As *citoyens*, Frenchmen expect everyone to share a dedication to the values of liberal democracy. Thus, they will agree on basic principles and rights, procedures for democracy, and what is right constitutionally. For the French, language acquisition and universal values are common themes of nationalism.

Understanding how French identity has changed in the previous two to three decades incorporates the discussion of French colonial legacy in North Africa. This legacy introduces the Muslim dynamic to the French identity and will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁸⁰ Tyler Stovall, and Georges Van Den Abbeele, *French Civilization and its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, and Race*. (New York: Lexington Books, 2003), 195.

III. LES MUSULMANS...FIERTE, MEMOIRE, IDENTITE, ISLAMAPHOBIE, DISCRIMINATIONS, EXTREMISMES⁸¹

Has the tricolour changed from *bleu, blanc, rouge*, to *noir, blanc, beur*?⁸²

French notions of identity, developed over centuries and honed by such collective experiences as the Revolution and the German occupation, have been challenged by the arrival of a large Muslim population in France. France surely has absorbed newcomers throughout its past, but typically, this immigration entailed smaller influxes of people of European origin; these mini-waves often affected only one region at a time. Muslims, too, have been coming to France in measurable numbers since the nineteenth century, but usually as temporary “guest workers” whose status presupposes a return to their home countries. The rise of a significant, permanent Muslim minority has sparked concerns that Muslims in France will not assimilate, but instead will reshape French identity until it becomes unrecognizable to French *de souche*.⁸³ This chapter examines the Muslim minority in France as a political—and politically active force—as well as the impact of French Muslims on the ongoing national debate on the character and essence of French national identity is the subject of this chapter.

A. FRANCE IN ALGERIA; MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

Based on the universalist principles of the Republic, French laws since 1789 have insisted on the avoidance of ethnic or racial categories on state and other official documents. Despite these universalist ideas, categorization has always occurred within the society of France. As early as 1798, during the Napoleonic expedition in Egypt, the emperor himself reflected on the challenges of integrating Muslim subjects into the

⁸¹ *Fierté, Mémoire, Identité, Islamaphobie, Discriminations, Extrémismes* or Pride, Memory, Identity, Islamophobia, Discrimination, and Extremism, is the slogan of the 2007 24th Annual Conference of Muslims in France, held in Paris, April 13-16, 2007.

⁸² This quotation from a Muslim man was heard by the author during interviews at the Grande Mosque of Paris, April 5, 2007.

⁸³ The term “*de souche*” translated literally means “of trunk,” as per tree, or stump; however, many in France refer to “true” French citizens as *de souche* or *juste*.

French empire.⁸⁴ Tyler Stovall, professor of the University of California at Berkeley, has noted that “the genius of France is that it tends to assimilate those it administers to.” During its colonial empire and thereafter, France elevated “those it colonized to the level of French citizens, even French thinkers.”⁸⁵ This elevation was only partial, however, and subject to periodic restatement.

The colonization of African regions and the attendant immigration of non-Europeans into France created new delineations within French nationalism. With these extensive contacts with peoples of visibly different races, faiths, and cultural conventions, Frenchmen began to distinguish between French citizens and French subjects. Algeria presented a special case, however, in no small part because of the way in which the French set about establishing dominion over this northern African region after the Conquest of Algeria in 1830. In 1848 Algeria became a French territory, introducing different types of subjects to the French community. These groups included but were not limited to European colonists, Jews, and Algerians.

The basic problem for any imperial power was how to pacify a diverse foreign peoples with a numerically inferior force. Cultural anxiety, that is to say, a lack of understanding of those to be colonized, fueled and shaped the colonizers’ response, which typically entailed co-opting a portion of an indigenous culture to facilitate the colonization and governance of the colony. For the French in Algeria, this tactic entailed the use of Berbers, or tribal Algerians outside the predominant Arab population, as their agents and allies in the colonial proposition. Like the Catholics in North Vietnam, the collusion of the minority Berbers with their French occupiers let the Berbers gain status and let the French gain control. Collusion of this sort had peculiar ramifications for Algerian immigration to France and the racial/cultural relations that attended this population shift.

The ethnic distinction between Arabs and Berbers forms the basis of the “Kabyle Myth,” which held that not only were Arabs and Berbers always at war, but Arabs were

⁸⁴ Tyler Stovall and Georges Van Den Abbeele, *French Civilization and its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, and Race*. (New York: Lexington Books, 2003), 216.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 106.

lazy and slow, while Berbers were practical, not overly religious, and hardworking—thus they could be assimilated into France.⁸⁶ Indirectly, the Kabyle Myth led to the initial anti-Arab/anti-Islam racism in France. The Berbers served as assistants to the colonists, *les Pieds Noirs*, who became the leaders of Algeria. Immigration was encouraged initially. In the 1860s, however, the Second Empire discouraged all immigration and attempted to establish a *Royaume Arabe*, or Arab Kingdom, by installing families loyal to Charles X in Algeria.⁸⁷ In order to ensure loyalty in the young country, legislators crafted laws to naturalize children born in France to ensure those children would attend school, and, like the peasant children of provincial France in these same years, become attached to the nation. Subsequent laws also eliminated various privileges previously available to foreigners in order to encourage foreigners to strive to become French.⁸⁸

The 1865 Senatus Law granted rights to Algerians, but did not provide native political representation or the ability to hold public office.⁸⁹ This law inaugurated the entrenchment of racism in the French society, because although the Algerians were technically part of metropolitan France, the citizens of Algeria were not truly French. In 1889, the Third Republic reaffirmed *jus soli* (Latin for “right of the soil/territory”), affirming that being born in France, to include French territories, equated to French nationality. For colonists and the colonized, this nationality came in two varieties: Frenchmen born outside of France to one native French parent; or those born in France of two non-native parents. *Jus soli* meant that nationality was merely a prerequisite to citizenship.⁹⁰

From the 1830s through the 1960s, France asserted that Algeria was not just a colony but also a French national territory. Native-born Algerians were considered

⁸⁶ Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 197-8.

⁸⁷ Shepherd, 30.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 31.

⁸⁹ Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 217.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

national subjects for the preponderance of the colonial period.⁹¹ These Algerians became the primary influx of Muslim immigrants into continental France.

Muslim immigration into France largely began in the 1920s. The French government allowed Algerians, as members of the French colonial empire, to enter France as an expression of the country's gratitude to the Algerian soldiers who had fought valiantly on behalf of the French during World War I. In the interwar period, the French government thanked these French "patriots" with residence in the Hexagon, as well as the construction of the Grande Mosque of Paris and the Muslim Hospital. Also during the 1920s, idea of *Islam à la Française* emerged. Proponents of this Republican idea coined the phrase "*évolués*," referring to those Muslims worthy of citizenship—Algerians who were assimilated, or "sufficiently civilized."⁹²

Amid the long history of French colonialism, the most significant effects of the idea of *Françité* on Muslims in contemporary France were developed in the post-World War II era. On the one hand, in the years immediately after 1945, French elites viewed the colonial empire as the realm in which France would rediscover her greatness. In the art and film of the period, writers, directors, and painters alike praise colonization. As such, policymakers and large swathes of the public alike rejected any suggestion of abandoning territory in the French empire as a measure tantamount to national failure.⁹³

The formulation of post-Vichy immigration policy focused on remaining "color blind." Although social scientists made such recommendations after the war, French legislators refused to promulgate any references to place of origin, race or ethnicity. The French Republic remained confident that it could turn any person, regardless of social status or race, into a Frenchman.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Shepherd, 19.

⁹² Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 217.

⁹³ As has been argued by various French historians, the colonies were the central key to the reemergence of French strength. Some authors even believe the Vichy government was an attempt of agreeing with Germany in order to maintain/regain the empire. See W. D. Halls' *Politics, Society, and Christianity in Vichy France*. (Oxford: Berg, 1995).

⁹⁴ Shepherd, 13-14.

This belief continued, at least on the official level, with the expansion of Muslim migration after World War II, when the European Community required guest workers to facilitate the reconstruction of European countries. Muslim immigrants were mostly day laborers. They were not middle-class, with all the associated characteristics of upward mobility, predictable consumerism, and an interest in conforming to the conventions of Frenchness in order to get ahead. Mainly male; confined to cheap hotels or bleak dormitories in the *banlieues*, they did not become part of the French society. Everyday Frenchmen viewed these immigrants not as equals, but as guest-workers to be tolerated.

At the same time, although shunned French Muslims increasingly became a feature of French life. From the assimilation of the World War One Muslim veterans through the Second World War, African Frenchmen served in cabinet-level positions. Even amid the military and governance challenges in Algeria at the height of the Algerian crisis, from 1958 to 1962, the French Parliament contained a 9.5 percent Algerian representation, more or less proportionate to the Algerian population in metropolitan France. This representation ended in 1962 with the independence of Algeria.

B. THE ALGERIAN TRAVAILS

Other scholars have treated the evolution of France's North African colonies in detail; thus the historiography of this subject is summarized here only in brief.⁹⁵ Significant to the modern essence of Frenchness, however, are the events in Algeria and North Africa, which have shaped the modern French mind and affected the demographics of the Hexagon. Understanding the French psyche and its relations with and history in Africa will facilitate an understanding of contemporary French issues.

In the decade or so after World War II, the French government was faced with multiple events on the world stage that continued to diminish her status in the new, post-

⁹⁵ Detailed information on the history of colonization in North Africa and Algeria can be found in Michael Doyle's *Empires*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Douglas Porch's *The Conquest of the Sahara*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf & Co., 1984). Additionally, detailed information on warfare during the age of imperialism can be found in *The Cassell's History of Warfare Series*, specifically Porch's *Wars of Empire*.

World War II world, notably the conflict in Indochina,⁹⁶ and the even more desperate and destructive war in Algeria.⁹⁷ The rise of Arab nationalism, which precipitated the Suez Crisis of 1956, spread throughout North Africa. Encouraged by the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Tunisia and Morocco, two French colonies, demanded French withdrawal, with popular uprisings to underscore the point. Within half a year of Dien Bien Phu, concerted revolt broke out in the French *département* of Algeria. On November 1, 1954, the French Republic found itself facing the beginning of “the events in Algeria.”⁹⁸ On All Saints’ Day *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) guerrillas attacked Algerian military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities throughout the country. Simultaneously, the FLN used radio in Cairo to broadcast an announcement demanding that Algerian Muslims rise up in the nationwide fight for the “restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam.”

The reaction in Paris of François Mitterand, the French Minister of Interior, embraced armed suppression of the Algerian insurgents to French rule. This idea was echoed throughout the nation, as political elites affirmed the belief that Algeria was a French *département*.⁹⁹ As the FLN’s Armée de Libération Nationale continued its symbolic attacks, Frenchmen realized the significance of these actions as an assault on the essence of the nation. These FLN offenses were the first time since 1830 that Algerians had coordinated attacks against French rule. Such an assault on French

⁹⁶ Alistair Horne highlights that in eight years of the struggle in Indochina cost France more than it received in Marshall aid. He also highlights that by May 1953, 65 per cent of a French poll declared itself for ending the war in Indochina, but still the politicians ordered its soldiers to go on fighting. More information on the French experience, defeat, and subsequent withdrawal from Indochina can be found in Alistair Horne’s history of France, *La Belle France*, as well as *The Cambridge History of France*.

⁹⁷ The French idea of greatness was significantly dampened during the Vichy Regime. Immediately following World War II, the French psyche was continually affronted with attacks to its status. Although this paper does not have the opportunity to illuminate all of these, one can study more about the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 without French consultation as well as the allied failure to support the French in Indochina, resulting in her defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and eventual departure from the country, as two of the most significant.

⁹⁸ “The events in Algeria” is the description of the Algerian conflict, as it has been referred to by many Frenchmen.

⁹⁹ Shepard, 7.

territory, albeit in North Africa, coming immediately on the heels of the Dien Bien Phu humiliation, caused an upwelling of nationalistic sentiment.

French offensive operations in Algeria continued for almost eight years. Like the French Indochina Campaign, the Algerian War drained French finances and manpower, while dividing the society both politically and racially. From 1956 through 1962, French elites installed numerous affirmative-action type policies,¹⁰⁰ in an ill-fated attempt to right some of the previous injustices upon the indigenous peoples.¹⁰¹ In 1958, in response to problems within Algeria, the French government granted full citizenship to the Algerians. In May of that year, the “merry go round of collapsing governments” that was the Fourth Republic finally ended, as a result of foreign misadventures, as well as the protraction of the Algerian War.¹⁰² The void in government led to the return of Charles de Gaulle as the first president of the Fifth Republic.

De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic extended universal suffrage to Algerian men and women with local civil status, or those Algerians who were employed in the civil or military posts open to them. This accommodation represented a shift from assimilation to integration as a matter of policy, that is to say, that suffrage for Algerians would lead them to become French citizens both as voters and as Frenchmen. At the most basic level in 1958, Charles de Gaulle knew he could not win in Algeria by military means alone. He thus needed to find the optimal political solution. In addition to his program to ensure governmental positions to Algerian Muslims, de Gaulle worked to regain control of his generals in Algeria, who had become pro-Algerian French. He also strove to compromise with the *Pieds Noirs*¹⁰³ in order to maintain control of natural resources and nuclear testing areas within Algeria that were vital to metropolitan French interests and security concerns. He then invested millions of French francs into the Algerian economy

¹⁰⁰ These policies and attempts to install Muslims into government will be highlighted in the following section.

¹⁰¹ Shepherd, 19.

¹⁰² Horne, 393.

¹⁰³ *Les Pieds Noirs*, or the black feet, is a reference to the French description of continental Europeans that lived in Algeria. The following subsection of this chapter will further articulate the definition and relevance of the *Pieds Noir*.

to promote development with his “Constantine Plan,” the goal of which was to convince the Algerian Muslim population that their best economic interests were to be had in a coupling with France.¹⁰⁴ In 1962, he decided to withdraw and isolate the former colony politically, while socially reaffirming Frenchness at home and within the international system. De Gaulle believed that the French “dance on a European Stage, not an African one. ...[W]e are the leaders of Europe.” Such sentiments elevated the French in their own eyes; however, such policies also promoted further racism and ostracism at the time and in the period that has followed.¹⁰⁵

Despite de Gaulle’s initiatives, the dilemma faced by the French government remained how to promote genuine liberal rights—the innate rights of citizens—within the colonies in the midst of a race and cultural war. Determining whether Algerians were French citizens would require a broadening of the ideal of the French nation and citizen from the national ideal of the nineteenth century, as well as a sharp transformation from the kind of cultural-nationalist and integral-nationalist excesses of the era of the Dreyfus scandal or the Vichy government’s collaboration with the Holocaust. “France’s confrontation with the Algerian Revolution accelerated France’s efforts to define the identities of the people of Algeria and to do so in ways that both guaranteed French rule and coincided with Republican principles.”¹⁰⁶

At least until the war dragged on, the French had viewed Algeria as the idealized initial *colonie de peuplement*. The idea that the most significant French colony would share rights as subjects of the Empire, travel to and work in the Hexagon thus made Algeria unique in its status.¹⁰⁷ The events in Algeria engendered a collective French distaste for Algeria, as well as an aversion toward Africans. Frenchmen began to view the Algeria situation as a pending or even ongoing defeat of France, while the French economic boom in the 1960s led to more immigration into the Hexagon. These

¹⁰⁴ The Constantine Plan was the creation of Charles De Gaulle in order to quell the insurrection and provide economic incentives to Algerians. For more information, see Tony Smith’s *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

¹⁰⁵ Shepherd, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 51.

¹⁰⁷ Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 203.

simultaneous occurrences led to the “idea of vicious and treacherous Arabs.”¹⁰⁸ Beliefs of an ungrateful, bloodthirsty, and extremely different peoples, both culturally and religiously, grew amongst Frenchmen throughout the years following the French withdrawal from Algeria. The failure of policy and arms in Algeria not only hampered French illusions of grandeur, but led to intolerance in French society where the echoes of racism and even genocide were not so faint granted the experience of the age of imperialism and total war.

The idea of intolerance to a race was nothing new for Europeans in general and the French in particular. As Tyler Stovall articulated, there exists in France significant intolerance to non-French races, even while racism remains a taboo concept in the French universalist discourse of the ideal citizen and society. In lieu of intolerance, Frenchmen use such words as “immigration” and “immigrants” to refer to Africans, mostly Algerians. Stovall argues that this racism is seated in the history of the Algerian conflict, an “unresolved dispute” with a “bad legacy.”¹⁰⁹ He continues that the “genesis of conceptual constructions produced to represent North African immigrants and their evolution within French society” led to the idea of the nationalist and the foreigner. These terms were believed to be a “new construction,” though it is not new at all. Stovall depicts this “new” racism as a result of historical amnesia, where French nationalism rebuked the “other” throughout its Republican history.¹¹⁰ Signally, despite the ideals of secularism that characterized modern French-ness did not apply outside of France. The French government in Algeria often colluded with the Church to operate schools and medical centers—and to facilitate conversion to Christianity as part of colonization.¹¹¹

The Algerian war, like the French Revolution, compelled a reassessment of the meaning of French citizenship amid crisis.¹¹² Although the phrase *Algeria c'est la*

¹⁰⁸ Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 203.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 187.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 200.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 199.

¹¹² Shepherd, 2-3.

France echoed throughout the 1950s, most continental Frenchmen abandoned it at the turn of the decade, specifically in 1962. Many believed the troubles in Algeria were overwhelming the French state and *les pieds noirs* began to be viewed more and more as European Algerians who became less and less French. On March 18, 1962, after years of horrific and dirty internal conflict, culminating in an attempted French military coup,¹¹³ the French government signed the Evian accords with leaders of the FLN. The basis of these accords was the French recognition of Algerians as different from other French citizens. The FLN delegation stated that Algerians required an independent state for the peoples of “Arab culture, Berber roots, and Islamic tradition.” Before 1962, French politicians had disputed this social difference. With the Evian Accords, however, the French leadership and the French public “announced” the segregation of the former department. The agreement also put the lie to the cherished ideal of a unified national identity, while insisting on a singular Frenchness, which the Algerians rejected as the metropolitan French rescinded it in the Evian Accords.

As Todd Shepherd remarked, de Gaulle’s actions solved the immediate political problem; however, by answering where the “question of colonization ends” only begged the question of where immigration begins.¹¹⁴ The popular French anticipation of 1962 was that Muslim Algerian immigrants would presently leave the Hexagon, and that French Algerians would not return to continental Europe.¹¹⁵ The resistance in Africa/Algeria was mostly religious and fostered an “us versus them” mindset. The majority of Algerians who had French citizenship in March of 1962—approximately 9

¹¹³ This author will not be so over ambitious as to attempt to explain within the confines of this chapter or even this thesis the historical complexity and intricacies of the French military attempt to oust the government of Charles de Gaulle in Paris. More information can be found in Tony Smith’s work, as well as the Time magazine article “The Third Revolt” published April 28, 1961, where the magazine highlighted “The first revolt brought down the Fourth Republic and boosted Charles de Gaulle to power. The second, when barricades went up in the streets of Algiers 15 months ago, was designed to stop De Gaulle from negotiating for an independent Algeria. But last week’s was no civilian uprising aided and abetted by soldiers. It was a mutiny in the army itself.” This article can be accessed at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,897733-1,00.html>.

¹¹⁴ Shepherd, 4.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 167.

million—had it revoked in 1963. These Muslims became “Algerians” (Algerians of Muslim origin), though a minority of these persons (nearly 1 million) was called European.

C. MUSLIMS IN FRANCE TODAY

De Gaulle and his government reshaped the vision that French citizens had both of themselves and of the “others.” “A France without Algeria signified a clean victory for republican values and not evidence that putting values premised in universalism into practice, institutionalizing them in the French republics, had depended on denying rights to a certain people: in this case, Muslims.”¹¹⁶ Still, the Fifth Republic was unable to successfully integrate Muslims and thus created the segregation and racism found in the contemporary idea of a wholly” European republic.¹¹⁷

After waging the brutal counter-guerilla campaign in North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, France opened its borders to many Arab North Africans. These Muslims came to France for many reasons, though two predominate. First, many North Africans who were loyal to the French were no longer welcome in their newly independent countries, and they came to France seeking the shelter of the culture and institutions they supported. Many others came in search of economic prosperity relative to their countries of origin.¹¹⁸ Thus, Muslim immigration and the French perception of these immigrants primarily continued along the lines of the Kabyle Myth. Frenchmen continued to harbor the belief of Arabs as dangerous and untrustworthy. The *Français de souche* saw these Arabs as different, both culturally and religiously, as well as a people whose practices in the home were drastically different from their own. (Key structures such as family relations and differing views on women’s rights further encouraged these beliefs.)

In the 1970s and 1980s, French society further changed. Until the late 1970s, most émigrés expected them to return to their countries of origin; their French “hosts”

¹¹⁶ Shepherd, 272.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 14-15.

¹¹⁸ Caldwell, 2.

tended to have the same aspirations for them.¹¹⁹ A drastic change occurred in Algeria, however, which up-ended these plans for many. The newly independent African nation with socialist inclinations endeavored to develop its economy, and it chose to use immigration as political tool. The Algerian government unilaterally cancelled all immigration to France. The government within the Hexagon responded by deporting Algerian guest workers, or by offering them incentives to depart the European continent. However, most of these immigrants chose to stay in France, as their children spoke French and they had limited ties to the African nation. Many of these former Algerians were peasants, who viewed returning to a socialist-policy regime as a lesser option. The fear of returning to socialist Algeria, coupled with their meager standard of living, convinced the majority to remain in France.

Indeed, throughout the 1970s, France's Muslim population continued to grow, despite the imposition of "zero tolerance" immigration laws. (Unemployment was soaring in France, a situation only exacerbated by the return of native French workers from Algeria, especially after Algeria nationalized its energy resources.) Although these stiffer controls were put in place to stem the flow of African immigrants, the Muslim population within France continued to swell due to illegal immigration, high birth rates, and an exception within the policy that permitted family reunification.¹²⁰

During this period, the term "*beur*" entered the French lexicon to replace "*immigré*," as Frenchmen realized that the *immigrés* were not going to return to their original countries. *Beur* refers to French national children of North African immigrants, who became a significant and visible part of French society in the 1960s–1980s, as they attempted to negotiate the problems of being French nationals but not citizens. This ubiquitous and exclusionary term demonstrates the persistence of colonialism, racism, and social stratification, despite the inclusive and universalist rhetoric of Republicanism.

¹¹⁹ Stovall and Van Den Abbeele, 206.

¹²⁰ Milton Viorst, "The Muslims of France: Islam Abroad." *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1996.

This structural hostility toward North Africans, mostly toward Arabs and Muslims, continues in all facets of French society.¹²¹

Indeed, in the 1950s, the French government in Algeria attempted to gain popular, international support by demonstrating Algerian Muslim women without veils. A choreographed show in May of 1958 featured the liberation of Muslim women via their “unveiling” accompanied by the phrase *Kif kif les françaises* (“Let’s be like the French women”).¹²² In many respects, this episode presages the “Battle of the Veil” that rages in France today.

Even amid the discriminatory and exclusionary measures, Muslim immigration, both legal and illegal, has feverishly continued. Today, the French Muslim population consists primarily of Muslims from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Of the 62.3 million people in France, approximately 5 million–6 million, or 8 percent to 10 percent, of the total population is Muslim. The French Muslim population is the largest in Western Europe.¹²³ Half of this population is comprised of French citizens.¹²⁴

D. THE FRENCH HEADSCARF

There are many types of Muslim immigrants in France. In addition to the diversity of ethnic groups that comprise the Muslim population within France, there are many types of headscarves. The two most popular are the *hijab*, first, and the *niquaab*. The meaning of *hijab* is curtain or partition. It is a scarf that generally covers the hair and conceals the neck. It leaves the face exposed and does not cover the bosom. The *niquaab*

¹²¹ The 1986 Devaquet Plan is an example of one such policy in which the government of French President Jacques Chirac recommended the elimination of the automatic citizenship for second-generation immigrants in lieu of an oath of allegiance and an expression of the desire to be French. One can trace the lineage of social stratification via many vehicles. One such is the vehicle of education, and the policies of the French government and its bureaucracy that manages French education. Various policies have inflamed tensions amongst disincorporate portions of French society. These begin as early as 1959 with the Berthoin Plan and develop through the modern period that this study focuses on in the next chapter. One can further review these policies in Hans N. Weiler’s “The Politics of Reform and Nonreform in French Education.”

¹²² Shepherd, 187.

¹²³ “Muslims in Europe: Country Guide.” <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm> (accessed September 12, 2006).

¹²⁴ Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority.” 2.

covers the hair, forehead and face, but leaves an opening for the eyes. It is particularly prevalent in south Asia.¹²⁵ The *hijab* is the most pervasive in France.

Patrick Weil, one of the members of the Stasi Commission, described the five reasons that women in France wear the veil, as the Commission found. First, Weil stated that many women wear headscarves because their oppressive male relatives require them to don a head covering. The headscarf as a symbol of male oppression was also echoed in an ABC Foreign Correspondent news story. An Iranian-born writer who was interviewed equated the *hijab* to the yellow star that Jews were forced to wear by the Nazis. She sees the scarf as “the symbol with authorizes violence towards women, that defines women as sub-human.”¹²⁶

Some Muslim women see the scarf in exactly opposite terms. Instead of a symbol of oppression, many women see the symbol as an articulation of free belief, or the ability simply to practice what they believe. These young women view the headscarf as a “free outward expression of identity during a young woman’s exploration of her religious commitment.”¹²⁷ In the same vein, some see the *hijab* a symbol of righteousness and purity, “thereby gaining respect in their local community.”¹²⁸

Still other Muslims view the head covering as important to their safety, as a form of protection against male pressure. Many of these women believe wearing the scarf is a paradoxical “form of liberation from familial constraints and a way to avoid the macho rebukes of brothers concerned with their sister’s chastity.”¹²⁹ Distinct from the oft-revealing French and other European styles of dress, for these Muslims the *hijab* is a

¹²⁵ “Muslim Women, the Veil, and Western Society.” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416784> (accessed November 14, 2006).

¹²⁶ Evan Williams, “France-Headscarfed.” <http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1106690.htm> (accessed November 23, 2006).

¹²⁷ Laurence and Vaisse, 165.

¹²⁸ Zachary Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe*. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 77.

¹²⁹ Laurence and Vaisse, 166.

“coat of armor, shielding them from the jeering comments and sexual harassment which sometimes comes from men in public places.”¹³⁰

The Stasi Commission found, as a fourth reason, that the young Muslim population was returning to the cultures of their countries of origins. Many of these young Muslims said they believed their parents had become too French, while they themselves did not feel French. They wear the headscarf as an expression of identity *and* freedom against secular parents.

Similarly, the final reason identified by the Stasi Commission was that for some Muslim women, the headscarf was not just a return to their legacy, but additionally a statement of opposition to western and secular society. These women believe that Western society pressures women into wearing revealing clothes and looking glamorous. These women, instead, believe that wearing a *hijab* “forces men to respect them for their intellect and abilities, not their looks.”¹³¹

Dr. Zachary Shore adds that the trend of wearing a veil is often construed to mean a return to militancy. Shore also notes that the trend is growing among Muslim youth, and adds fashion as one desire for wearing a head covering. He states in his book that “enough French Muslims wear colorful designer headscarves that instead of being called by its actual name ‘tchador,’ some have nicknamed it a ‘tchadior’ after the famous designer, Christian Dior.”¹³²

The headscarf has become a symbol to many French citizens in a society where symbols are held dear. The reverence for symbols—for example, the *tricolour*, which is rooted in the French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958, as the national emblem of the Republic; or the fair, white Marianne, who represents fairness, bravery, and triumph—is as much a part of French culture as Republican values, fine wine, and elegant cheeses. The headscarf and the Muslim girls who wear it have become to be viewed as challenges to everything French. In the event, the French response to Muslim headscarves in their

¹³⁰ Shore, 77.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

midsts is profoundly un-French, if one takes the ideals of the Enlightenment and the Revolution at their word. Though the French state has enforced social and economic participation throughout history, the modern “Headscarf Debate” manifests a lack of participation. The French state and its society advocate *liberté, égalité, and fraternité*, but is it only for those who subscribe to the one true vision of Frenchness?

IV. INTEGRATION OR SEGREGATION?

Prejudice is the greatest friend of extremists. ... The more anti-Islam sentiment is expressed, the more it will drive people into the arms of extremists.¹³³

The Muslim population in France is a prominent and permanent fixture, which continues to expand. Current demographics indicate that by 2015, Europe's Muslim population will double, whereas Europe's non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 percent. The majority of European Muslims will reside in France.¹³⁴ For this reason, the current challenge to French society—how to integrate or assimilate its Muslims and accommodate Islam—will only become more urgent.¹³⁵ As a parliamentary democracy, the Fifth Republic has turned increasingly to legislation to manage the friction caused by the growth of the Muslim population. The 2003 ban on

¹³³ Quotation from terrorism expert cited by Elizabeth Neuffer in "Islamaphobia in Europe Fuels Tensions." *Boston Globe*. (June 20, 1995), from Lexus/Nexus.

¹³⁴ Savage, 28.

¹³⁵ Nezar Al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells, eds., *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002); Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within*. (New York: Doubleday Press, 2006); Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*. (Rand Corporation, 2006); Claire Berlinski, *Menace in Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis is America's, Too*. (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006); John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); "Europe's Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other." *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. www.pewglobal.org; Stéphanie Giry, "France and its Muslims," *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2006); Philip Gordon, "Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France." (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006); Trica Danielle Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion*. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006); and Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 29.

headscarves in French schools is the most controversial measure.¹³⁶ The real question is whether such measures promote Muslim integration by forcing Muslims to accept the historic secularism of the Republic, or whether they are measures designed to exclude Muslims. Furthermore, if France is an inclusive and tolerant society, then are such laws as the *hijab* ban fundamentally un-French?

Integration is a process through which immigrants move into a culture and adopt its norms, conventions and way of life.¹³⁷ That is not to say that integrating newcomers are required to relinquish all of their own customs or identities. But the government and society expect that immigrants and their children will understand and accept particular practices (speaking French, say) and, more importantly, obey the laws of the land. French law mandates the separation of church and state, just as official secularism forms part of the French Republican values.

As the second chapter of this thesis details, when the French Republic defined *laïcité*, as a fundamental principle, the national school system, along with the army of the Republic, was expected to propagate this ideal. The French school system of that period put into practice “the clear distinction between church and state.”¹³⁸ Today, when these Third-Republic-versus-the-Church conflicts are less prominent, school headmasters sit

¹³⁶ Although the headscarf ban is the first significant legislation that is allegedly anti-Muslim, the French courts have been used to prosecute Muslims for practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and *abbatage clandestine*, or ritual animal slaughter. These prosecutions were the result of arrests made due to violations in French criminal laws. For example, Muslims conducting FGM on their daughters were prosecuted under Article 312-3 of the Penal Code (Exercising violence against or seriously assaulting a child under 15). French criminal laws that have been used to challenge Muslim rituals include those such as concerning intentional or negligent assault, the unlicensed practice of medicine, cruelty to animals, etc. For more information, see the U.S. State Department report available at <http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/rep/9304.htm>. More information is also available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/spencer93_text.html#4.%20Legal%20Interventions%20-%20legislation%20and%20child%20protection_T

¹³⁷ In this connection we also must establish what integration is *not*. One cannot determine levels of integration by reviewing statistics on hate crime. Although racial—and racist—rhetoric often precipitates or accompanies these crimes, there are a myriad of factors not necessarily related to the integration of a given population into a broader society at play. Integration is also not related to the number of mosques constructed or the percentage of the population that claims to be Muslim. These statistics capture only the religious beliefs of a people and are not indicative of levels of integration.

¹³⁸ Cesari, Jocelyn, “Young, Muslim, and French. Islam and French Secularism: The roots of the Conflict.” http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/printable/france_briefing_print.html (accessed November 12, 2006)

dutifully at the gates of school grounds to ensure young Muslims remove their head coverings before entering the state-controlled facilities.

The Moroccan-born French scholar of Islam, Rachid Benzine, believes the French concept of secularism fails to understand the new challenges of cultural and religious diversity. “The problem is whether France can accept that former colonial subjects can be French.” He writes, “[C]an an Arab really be French? We have a common past of conflict. We are unable to forgive each other. The wound of the Algerian conflict has not healed. So it’s hard to live together and create a common project.”¹³⁹

A. THE STASI COMMISSION AND THE RISE OF ISLAMAPHOBIA

In 2002, as a result of recent media coverage of violence in schools, the president of the French National Assembly convened a commission to study “religious symbols in schools.”¹⁴⁰ Shortly thereafter, President Chirac appointed the Stasi Commission, which was given a significantly wider scope—*laïcité* throughout society. The Stasi Commission—named after its chief researcher, Bernard Stasi—consisted of school officials, academics, politicians, businesspersons, and civil servants from all religious affiliations, political opinions, and national origins.¹⁴¹ The far-reaching Stasi Commission interviewed hundreds of citizens, reviewed French law, and took testimony from members of all social strata in order to determine the state of secularism within French society.

Throughout 2002 and 2003, anti-Islamic fundamentalism was on the rise within French society in response to what many French citizens saw as a “France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist groups who use public schools as their battleground.”¹⁴² Fears of Islamic terrorists had been growing throughout France for more than a

¹³⁹ “Europe, Islam’s New Front Line: France.” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4205231> (accessed November 30, 2006)

¹⁴⁰ Patrick Weil, “A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims, and the Headscarf.” www.openDemocracy.net; (accessed November 23, 2006) 1.

¹⁴¹ Weil, 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 2. “Fundamentalism,” in this context, refers specifically to openly religious Muslims; the connotation associates terrorism with fundamentalism and, thus, establishes fundamentalism as a threat to the Republic.

decade.¹⁴³ In December of 1994, the Algerian terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), brazenly hijacked an Air France plane with the intention of blowing it up over Paris or flying it into the Eiffel Tower. Although French Special Forces troops eventually boarded the jet and killed all four Algerian hijackers, the event resulted in the death of three passengers and widespread international media attention.¹⁴⁴ Coverage of the event led to a European-wide fear that Islamic terrorists would destroy a plane over Paris. On July 25, 1995, four GIA members—all French citizens—bombed the Paris Metro in an apparent attempt to dissuade the French government and its constituents from supporting the government in Algeria. These showy attacks by Islamic extremists in the heart of Paris led the French body politic to rethink its support of the regime in Algiers. Additionally, the French population began to worry about their Muslim neighbors.¹⁴⁵ The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further fueled this incipient fear of Muslim immigrants in France.

A spectre is haunting Europe. This is not the spectre of communism to which Marx and Engels were referring but rather the spectre of Islam and Islamic ‘terrorism’...around the time of the attack on the Twin Towers in New York. ... Islam and Muslims had generally had a bad press in the West well before that time, but that tragedy has dramatically worsened the situation.¹⁴⁶

“Islamaphobia” is the term that many authors use to describe non-Muslims’ fear of Muslims as fanatics or terrorists destined to cause violence within society. Within France, Islamaphobia was stoked in the 1980s and 1990s by the actions of the GIA and other North African terror organizations; this phobia drastically increased in the latter half of the 1990s and the early years of the new century as terrorists touting Islamic extremism brazenly attacked both physical targets and persons throughout Western

¹⁴³ The war in Algeria and the history of colonialism in Northern Africa had developed a fear of Islam; however, this fear was markedly heightened in the recent history with the aforementioned Islamic terror attacks in Europe and the United States. For more information on the debate of secularism versus Islamism in French colonies, see Michael W. Doyle’s *Empires*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986).

¹⁴⁴ Peter St. John, “Insurgency, Legitimacy, and Intervention in Algeria.” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com.asp>. (accessed August 16, 2006).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Jack Goody, *Islam in Europe*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 1.

society. The September 11 attacks in the United States and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Holland took their place in the French psyche alongside the GIA attacks inside the borders of France in the 1990s as still more—and more terrifying—Islamic terrorism.¹⁴⁷

In this connection, many French citizens began to realize that the failure of French society to integrate an ever-expanding Muslim immigrant population would continue to have significant repercussions in and for the country. Thus the Stasi Commission began its labor throughout the Republic to determine the extent and health of *laïcité* as well as such far-reaching and more difficult questions as the successes and failures of immigration policies, integration, assimilation, nationality laws, religious holidays, and so on. After four months of public hearings, travel, and research the Commission endorsed a report with twenty-five different measures, including a ban on all conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. Of the twenty-five recommendations, President Chirac chose to implement only the ban on religious symbols.¹⁴⁸

Commission member Patrick Weil said:

[A]fter we heard the evidence, we concluded that we faced a difficult choice with respect to young Muslim girls wearing the headscarf in state schools. Either we left the situation as it was, and thus supported a situation that denied freedom of choice to those—a very large majority—who do not want to wear the headscarf; or we endorsed a law that removed freedom of choice from those who do want to wear it. We decided to give freedom of choice to the former during the time they were in school, while the latter retain all their freedom for life outside school. ... [C]omplete freedom of choice was, unfortunately, not an offer. This was less a choice between freedom and restriction than a choice between freedoms; our commission was responsible for advising on how such freedoms should both be guaranteed and limited in the best interests of all.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ For more information on the Van Gogh murder and recent Islamic attacks within Europe see Ian Buruma's *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*. (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), and Bruce Bawer's *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within*. (New York: Doubleday Press, 2006).

¹⁴⁸ Weil, 1.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

The Commission studied the reasons that young Muslims wear the veil; however, they also heard testimony from those young women who choose not to cover their heads. The Commission found that in the two to three years before they began their work, a trend had surfaced within many schools. In schools where some girls wore the scarf and others did not, there was “strong pressure on the latter to ‘conform’.”¹⁵⁰ The Commission members also received testimony from Muslim men who had paid to transfer their daughters from public schools to private, Catholic schools in order to alleviate the pressure on their daughters to cover.¹⁵¹ Commission members believed they found a clear majority of schoolgirls who did not wear the *hijab*; thus the commission recommended its removal from school grounds.

The goal of the Commission’s findings and President Jacques Chirac’s decision was to limit social exclusion. The underlying belief held that such laws as the headscarf ban advance the integration of a population. When he announced the implementation of the ban, Chirac said, “I refuse to take France in that direction,”¹⁵² meaning *communautarisme*, or the situation when ethnic or religious groups segregate themselves and form their own individual states within a state. The French had legislated integration in the recent past, arguably with good results. As sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad¹⁵³ wrote in *The Suffering of the Immigrant*,¹⁵⁴ French laws of decades ago created a situation that promoted the integration of Algerians. Although these Algerians could not have applied for citizenship individually, when they were automatically granted nationality in France, they were “discreetly satisfied” that their citizenship was “imposed by law.” He further wrote

[French] nationality ... occurred by itself, as a constraint collectively imposed: it is a condition shared by all, not by the result of individual or

¹⁵⁰ Weil, 2.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁵² “France Divided over Headscarf Ban.” <http://economist.com/> (accessed November 17, 2006) 3.

¹⁵³ Abdelmalek Sayad is a renowned sociologist and author. The above quoted work as well as his others is referenced by numerous scholars that this author encountered during research for this project.

¹⁵⁴ Abdelmalek Sayad, *The Suffering of the Immigrant*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

voluntary acts. ... Despite protestations of all sorts that are the “right thing to proclaim,” despite the guilt or simple unease that continues to be felt by the naturalized, this “forced” naturalization finally produces something like a satisfaction which, for a whole series of reasons, asks to remain secret and, sometimes, resigned to.¹⁵⁵

This discourse of social exclusion and inclusion continued after the Commission findings were announced and later implemented. Although rallies and protests began throughout Europe and the Middle East as Muslim women demanded the right to wear the veil, many more women supported the law.¹⁵⁶ As one interviewer found, fifteen-year-old Siham said that she believed that “some teachers would not see beyond the scarf and judge us. It’s best if we have to take it off.” Rama Kourouma, a French Muslim high school student said with a smile that “faith is in the heart” and agreed that religion should not be propounded in school through symbols.¹⁵⁷ French social scientist Jonathan Laurence said, “The ban can thus be seen as part of a larger effort to reduce the further development of certain religious inclinations and to prevent the potential development of dual loyalties among France’s Muslim population—a development that the government fears is being stoked by transnational pressures.”¹⁵⁸

B. EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON CONTEMPORARY FRENCH SOCIETY

Determining the post-implementation impacts of the ban on society in France in these initial years is a task that poses particular challenges to the researcher. This study focuses on the direct impact as can be measured in institutions of education and the impacts on public opinion. For one thing, the ban is in its infancy, so only the most immediate effects are in evidence now. For another thing, while students of similar social questions in America readily can look to records of incidents, enrollments, suspensions, expulsions, and other school and public sources, French law prohibits any

¹⁵⁵ Weil, 3.

¹⁵⁶ According to a poll in the 2004 *Economist* article “France Divided over Headscarf Ban.” <http://economist.com/> (accessed November 17, 2006) 3; while only 42 percent of the Muslim population in France supported the ban, 49 percent of Muslim women supported it.

¹⁵⁷ “Headscarf Defeat Riles French Muslims.” <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4395934.stm> (accessed November 21, 2006)

¹⁵⁸ Laurence and Vaisse, 166-167.

identification of its citizens on the basis of national origin, race, or religion, which means that the records are incomplete for such an inquiry.¹⁵⁹

Nonetheless, some evidence does support some initial conclusions about the ban. Overall so far, the headscarf ban seems to have had little impact on the society. It has been enduringly popular. Every political party has endorsed the ban, and according to a recent Pew survey, 75 percent of French citizens support the ban.¹⁶⁰ Most tellingly, no Muslim group in France has opposed the ban. Not even the Organization of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), the Muslim organization with the most prominence among the urban, poorer (and presumably more radicalized) populations, has requested a repeal of the law.¹⁶¹ Andrée Feillard, an Indonesian who resides in France, wrote that “statistics indicate that about 80 percent of Muslim women in France do not wear headscarves. Hence, only 20 percent wear headscarves.” In the same article, Syafiq Hasyim, the Deputy Director for the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, was quoted to the effect that the majority of Muslim figures in French society believe the headscarf is not an important religious matter.¹⁶² Statements such as these may demonstrate a level of Europeanization or French influence on the Islam practiced in France.

Some figures still oppose the law, though they support the French legal and political system. Rachid Hamoudi, the UOIF leader and director of a mosque in Lille, said “The law is unfair to Muslims, but we’ve put it behind us.”¹⁶³ Statements like that of Mr. Hamoudi can be interpreted several ways—indifference, apathy, disgust, or potentially as a sign of acceptance of a democratic decision. In other words, all dissent about the ban does not correlate directly with fundamentalist or radical or terroristic agendas.

¹⁵⁹ The last census in France to include religious affiliation was administered in 1872. Stéphanie Giry, “France and its Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2006), 89.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with U.S. Embassy Political Officer, April 4, 2007.

¹⁶¹ “Headscarf Defeat Riles French Muslims.”

¹⁶² Andrée Feillard, “Most Muslim Women in France Do Not Wear Headscarves.” <http://islamlib.com/en/page.php?article&mode=print&id=542>, (accessed November 21, 2007).

¹⁶³ “Headscarf Defeat Riles French Muslims.”

Statistics from schools in France since the ban reveal the minimal effects of the headscarf restriction even on the realm in which it was supposed to matter, namely the French education system. A political officer at the United States Embassy in Paris¹⁶⁴ stated that no significant change has occurred in suspensions or expulsions related to the wearing of religious symbols in French public schools. The officer focuses his daily attention on the Muslim dynamic within French society, and he stated that, in the course of his work, he had interviewed many Parisian headmasters and found no significant problems with the implementation of the ban. He also stated that during his daily perusal of local media outlets since the ban, he had been unable to find a substantial amount of media coverage of any incidents involving a suspension or expulsion.¹⁶⁵ In *Muslim Girls and the Other France*, Trica Keaton adds, “Even more striking are the results of a survey reported by *Le Monde*, which showed that 91 percent of teachers polled had never been confronted by a ‘veiled’ student in the schools where they teach, while a reported 65 percent had never seen a ‘veiled’ girl in their class in their career. And yet 76 percent of teachers polled favored the law.”¹⁶⁶

No currently available information on enrollment rates at public schools suggests any significant change in enrollments that one might ascribe to the headscarf ban. Private school enrollment in France has increased slightly since 2004.¹⁶⁷ Unfortunately, French law prohibits determining the nationality of these new private school students. The most meaningful source from which conclusions might be drawn are requests for private, Muslim school construction and/or openings. In France, all schools, public or private, are subject to monitoring of curriculum in accordance with the national curriculum and safety

¹⁶⁴ Information garnered through emails and telephonic interviews conducted by author with one of the Political Advisors to the US Ambassador to France, and US Military officers assigned to US Embassy, Paris, who interface with Parisian society on a daily basis. All interviewees have requested anonymity.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with US Embassy Political Officer, April 4, 2007.

¹⁶⁶ Trica Danielle Keaton, *Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion*. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), 181. As the term “veiled” in the above survey can be mistranslated to include various forms of head coverings, in this context, it is considered to include any form of Islamic headdress.

¹⁶⁷ Private schools in France primarily consist of Catholic institutions that receive state funding. These schools incorporate students of all religions. Most importantly for the purpose of this argument is successive information specific to Muslim schools that, although also open to students of any religion, currently host a predominance if not exclusive, Muslim student population.

regulations, as well as administrator and teacher certification. These tenets of French law exist to promote equality in education regardless of religious affiliation.¹⁶⁸ In 2003, the Lycée Averroes High School, the first approved Muslim school, opened in Lille, with a local Muslim teacher serving as the headmistress. Ms. Sylvie Taleb now covers her head at school, although she had not previously covered during her seventeen years of experience teaching at a local Catholic school.¹⁶⁹ This mosque-housed school—and the habit of such a response—grew out of the mosque’s 1994 efforts to educate Muslim girls who had been expelled for wearing headscarves in public schools that had implemented their own bans before the law went nationwide. The school applied for and received permissions to open in 2003. Non-Muslim students are welcome to apply, and the language of instruction is French.

To date only three Muslim schools have opened in France, while the central government has processed an additional four requests for the creation of Muslim schools. The records do not suggest the existence of a significant number of illegal, private schools along the lines of the forerunner to the Lille school of the 1990s.¹⁷⁰ In other words, the evidence shows that most Muslim students are remaining in French public schools, despite the headscarf ban. They are neither segretated nor self-segregating. Moreover, the longer these students remain in the French schools, the likelier they are to integrate into French society. They will bring their elders closer to the French mainstream, and their children will be even more fluent in French and, hopefully, inculcated with French values.

If youth are the key to generational integration and the school system is the secular means to this end, then the rise of *les filles cabas* is one indication of how some young Muslims are attempting to integrate despite resistance from their local Muslim communities. *Les filles cabas*, or “shopping bag girls,” are young Muslim French women who always carry a small bag or makeup kit with them. As they depart their Muslim

¹⁶⁸ “Muslim School Opens in Secular France.” <http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/world/story/0,4386,212093,00.html> (accessed December 4, 2006). See also <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3059933.stm> (accessed 21 May 2007).

¹⁶⁹ “Muslim School Opens.”

¹⁷⁰ Interview with USEMB, Paris staff members, November/December 2006, and April 4, 2007.

neighborhood they wear their traditional garb with a head covering, but underneath they have on western-style clothing. Thus, they can remove their “armor” when they depart their Muslim neighborhood in the public-housing projects and enter “proper” France.¹⁷¹ In this way, they maintain a presence in both worlds.

To be sure, this double-existence is not integration, although it may be a step on the way. The true test of integration for many of these young Muslims will come after their school years, when they no longer will have the “safety net” of a French law to protect them if they choose to remove their scarves. Ultimately, they will have to negotiate for themselves some kind of resolution—though the question remains whether they will find any compromises in tradition-minded families. At the same time, those who choose to wear the *hijab* face the same conundrum vis-à-vis non-Muslim France: will conventional, traditional French co-workers support a woman’s decision to cover her hair according to her beliefs? Will they view the headscarf as a symbol of the woman opposed by a backwards-looking fanatical tradition? Or will they ostracize their peer for being too plainly un-French? Will young Muslim women be forced to choose between proudly displaying their religious beliefs or a professional life in the French workforce?¹⁷²

C. RACISM COUNTERS INTEGRATION

As we have seen, the “received” French history of Muslim immigration depicts Muslims moving from North Africa to serve as *les tirailleurs*, or conscripts to the French Army during the two world wars, as well as Muslim immigrants into continental France to serve as laborers in post-war reconstruction. Much debate has centered on the “sudden” appearance of “second-generation immigrants” in the 1980s, even though race has been a prominent factor in the French psyche for centuries.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Amara, 74.

¹⁷² “Headscarf Defeat Riles French Muslims.”

¹⁷³ Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds., *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 4-5.

The “sudden” appearance of these immigrants in contemporary France is a product of the “structured exclusion”¹⁷⁴ of Muslim immigrants in (and by) French society in the previous three to five decades. As French society introduced immigrant populations, these immigrants were relegated to suburbs throughout the major metropolitan areas of the country.¹⁷⁵ Such names as Clichy-Sous-Bois and Argenteuil are today synonymous with the impoverished housing projects that are scattered across the *banlieues*, those working-class suburbs of major cities, including Paris, that are primarily constituted of working- and lower-class immigrant families.¹⁷⁶

Additionally, the preponderance of these *banlieues* is not actively patrolled by the police. In fact, the police are almost entirely reactive, turning up in these areas only to apply heavy-handed tactics to quell violence.¹⁷⁷ During an interview with French law enforcement, this author was shocked to learn that the French police do not believe in community policing, a program of engaged, proactive local law enforcement that has found much favor in unruly urban areas in the United States. The French police rejected any suggestion of hiring officers of certain ethnicities or religions to work in areas that were represented by that ethnicity or religion as racist, a first step toward *communautarisme*. Our candid conversation revealed that racial profiling, deemed racist and illegal in the United States, is an accepted practice among the police force in France.¹⁷⁸ Openly separate (and unequal) law enforcement makes just one example of the “structured exclusion” that keeps untold French Muslims from feeling entirely at home in the Hexagon.

¹⁷⁴ This term is used by Trica Keaton as a chapter title.

¹⁷⁵ The deplorable housing known as *bidonvilles*, *shantytowns*, and later *banlieues* is vividly described by Abdelmalek Sayad, the renowned sociologist and author in his study *L’immigration* (1991).

¹⁷⁶ The city of Paris and its environs house one-third of the French Muslim population. The immense cost of living in the city pushes most lower-class and many working-class citizens, disproportionately immigrants, beyond the *Peripherique*, or periphery road that surrounds the city. The majority of these areas surrounding Paris are included in the government’s 751 *zones sensibles*, or sensitive zones. These areas are infamous for crime and many were flashpoints in the November 2005 riots.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Paris police officers in the Sixth Arrondissement, April 5, 2007.

This “structured exclusion” is a “metaphor for hypocrisy” in communities where youth are taught Republican values and *égalité* in their “exclusive” multi-story slums of the “outercity,” while the children of the *Français de souche* remain in their idyllic French urban or rural lives.¹⁷⁹ *Français de souche*, or those French citizens with a native-French lineage, often refer to themselves as the *Françaises justes*, or true French. As noted above, French legislation, steeped in universal Republican values, prevents any reference to race or ethnicity in bureaucratic matters, census, etc. However, colorblind French society is supposed to be, race is of signal concern in contemporary life for the people in and around these racialized communities.¹⁸⁰ In Paris in 1997, Peabody and Stovall regularly saw street graffiti with racist phrases such as “Islam equals AIDS,” underscoring the existence among some of a view of Muslims as a “large group of undesirables.”¹⁸¹

This situation was thrust to the forefront of the “true” Frenchmen’s consciousness when, in the summer of 2005, French and international media aired the story of the “*Affaire des incendies*.” These accounts not only reported the deadly apartment fires that killed numerous low-income sub-Saharan immigrant squatters as they perished inside condemned residential structures, but they also thrust into the public spotlight the profound social inequalities that immigrants, particularly Muslims, face in France today.¹⁸²

In France, the unemployment rate among Muslims is generally double that of non-Muslims. In addition, comparatively low educational achievement and, subsequently, meager skill levels, perhaps a product of sequestration and reluctance to allow women to achieve educational goals, creates a uniquely low level of workforce participation by Muslim women in particular. In France, the “face of crime” is increasingly young, and Muslim. Media coverage of “Islamic terrorists” and police

¹⁷⁹ Keaton, 58-59.

¹⁸⁰ As Peabody and Stovall state, the reluctance of the French authorities’ to address race only serves to reinforce its centrality and validity as a category of analysis. Peabody and Stovall, 17.

¹⁸¹ Peabody and Stovall, 207.

¹⁸² Ibid., 208.

shows that mirror the U.S. television series, “Cops,” only further stoke the flames of fear and segregation.¹⁸³ As a *New York Times* article in April of this year articulated, racism in employment is endemic in the country, with persons having names of Arabic or African origin 50 percent less likely to receive a job than someone named François or Nathalie.¹⁸⁴ That same *New York Times* article described the conditions in the suburbs of Paris as well as the racism and brutality of police as providing the tinder for an inevitable explosion.

In late March 2007, at the Gare du Nord—a major transfer point in the public transportation station in France that connects rail to metro, as well as a primary stop on the line to the Charles de Gaulle International Airport—a young, Muslim Frenchman without a ticket was stopped by the ATP, the local transportation police. Approximately three hours and fifteen minutes later, 100 youths responded to this “affront to their immigrant brother” by rioting and burning ticket machines and key infrastructure. The authorities responded in force to quell the violence, which resulted in the arrest of nine immigrant youths.¹⁸⁵ To some observers, two Frances exist: the first is “democratic and dynamic”; the second, “old, conservative, and xenophobic.”¹⁸⁶ But can either France really accommodate the French Muslims?

D. ISLAM AND ISLAMAPHOBIA IN FRENCH POLITICS

As Trica Keaton highlights, the choice for those who love France is “not to fall back on reactivism, or to retreat from reason, or even to lock ourselves into some form of fixed identity politics. It means that a strategy has to be found to include your ‘other’ children in the nation, without reducing them to an outdated identity of Frenchness, or ethnic absolutism.”¹⁸⁷ Ideas like Dr. Keaton’s have spawned such groups as *SOS Racisme* and *Collectif égalité*, organizations that exist to counter racism and xenophobia.

¹⁸³ Keaton, 68.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with U.S. Embassy, Paris, staff member, April 4, 2007.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with U.S. Embassy, Paris, staff member, April 4, 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Keaton, xi.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

These fears underlie the current political shift to the right in France, however, and surely figured in the May 2007 presidential election victory of Nicholas Sarkozy.

The extreme right party in France, the National Front, led by former French paratrooper and Algeria veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen, has recently experienced unprecedented growth in membership and support. This rightward shift in mainstream politics has been dubbed by some the “Le Pen Effect.”¹⁸⁸ Political rhetoric has increased in volume and stridency in regard to restrictions on immigration and an increased emphasis on national interests both domestically and in EU policy debates.¹⁸⁹ Even though they affirm the efficacy of integration in public, many Frenchmen believe that European and Islamic values are not only incompatible but directly challenge one another. These Europeans see Muslims as challenge to their collective identity, traditional values, and public policies. Such cultural and religious distinctions as the wearing of the *hijab* and other Muslim accoutrements; the requirement for halal foods; seemingly ubiquitous mosque construction; Islam in schools; and demands for Muslim burial rites all serve to divide the French community. Further, the perceived lack of women’s rights in Muslim families, church-state relations, and Islam’s compatibility with democracy dominate political discourse.¹⁹⁰ It is an uneasy national conversation.

As political leaders and candidates attempt to resolve and reconcile these issues, Muslim leaders might serve as a part of the political process to promote understanding. Politically, the French Muslim community is involved in national life, however underrepresented they are in all institutions of the nation and society. Despite the French government’s attempts to develop and foster Muslim groups to represent the community, 23 percent of French Muslim citizens are not registered to vote, compared to 7 percent of the French population at large. A recent International Crisis Group study found that the political under representation and social disengagement of French Muslims should raise concerns in France, lest the void be filled with random violence or religious

¹⁸⁸ Stovall, 223.

¹⁸⁹ Savage, 36; Stovall, 204-206.

¹⁹⁰ Savage, 43.

radicalism.¹⁹¹ In 2004, the French Parliament received its first, openly Muslim members—two of 908 members—since the independence of Algeria and the departure of the Algerian representatives. This minimal representation, coupled with the fact that only 2.4 percent of all local elected officials are of North African origin, shows that, despite the large numbers of Muslims in France,¹⁹² they have yet to organize politically and make their voice—or voices—heard as members of the French polity.

It is important to remember that the French Muslim population does not speak with a single voice, particularly on matters of integration. Jytte Klausen, a European scholar who focuses on Muslim immigrants and societies within Europe, examined the public opinion on secularism in France. She highlighted three types of Muslims within French society: the Voluntarist, the Secular Integrationist, and the Neo-Orthodox. She found that the Voluntarists—those who believe that Muslims should not join or attempt to join the French mainstream *and* that this separation is compatible with French society—accounted for 30 percent of those surveyed. Some 60 percent of French Muslims fell into the category of Secular Integrationists, who believe French Muslims should join the French mainstream and are compatible with French society and values. Only 10 percent of those surveyed voiced the Neo-Orthodox belief that French Muslims should stay out of the mainstream and are not compatible with French society.¹⁹³

If Klausen's findings are accurate—and 90 percent of French Muslims generally support the French program of secularism or integration—then one must ask why the debate about integrating Muslims even exists within France. Indeed, a recent Pew survey found that large percentages of both the general public (74 percent) and the Muslim minority population (72 percent) feel there is no conflict between living in modern France and serving Allah as a devout Muslim.¹⁹⁴ Stéphanie Giry, in her October 2006

¹⁹¹ Giry, 97.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95.

¹⁹⁴ "Europe's Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other." *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. www.pewglobal.org, 3.

Foreign Affairs article, wrote: “The French must drop the assumption that the only ‘good’ Muslims eat saucisson [sausage/pork] with their red wine.”¹⁹⁵

Many scholars believe that either a rise in Islamaphobia has caused a Muslim backlash, or the Muslim failure to integrate has caused Islamaphobia. Zachary Shore of the University of California, Berkeley, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, wrote that “Pan-Islamism is rising in part because young Muslims feel excluded from European society as well as from their parents’ country of birth.”¹⁹⁶ This type of social isolation and Muslim self-encapsulation promotes a further inward turn of French Muslims. Polls demonstrate that in 2001, Muslim identification was stronger than in 1994, with the percentage of “believing and practicing” Muslims increased by 25 percent.¹⁹⁷ Reports of increased fundamentalism only serve to further French fears of these “others.”¹⁹⁸

The Pew Foundation’s findings do not support the idea of an overabundance of radical Islamists within France. Sixty-four percent of French Muslims stated that violence against civilian targets to defend Islam was “unjustified.”¹⁹⁹ At the same time, France also has one of the highest rates of inter-marriage between Muslims and traditional Europeans in Europe (in 1990, 20 percent to 30 percent of Algerian women below the age of 35 had married a Frenchman of non-Islamic background),²⁰⁰ which attests to a daily kind of integration and mutual acceptance of the most normal and normalizing sort. Despite this normalizing force, a Sorbonne professor who heads the *Observatoire des Discriminations*, a French think tank that focuses on workplace discrimination, found that a job applicant with a name of North African origin was six times less likely to get an interview than an applicant whose name sounded Franco-

¹⁹⁵ Stéphanie Giry, “France and its Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2006).

¹⁹⁶ Shore, 43.

¹⁹⁷ Savage, 31.

¹⁹⁸ David Rieff, “Battle Over the Banlieues.” *New York Times*, April 15, 2007.

¹⁹⁹ “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate.” 4.

²⁰⁰ Giry, 93.

French. In fact, the study further found that out of six factors being studied, only one—physical or mental disability— was more detrimental than being of African heritage.²⁰¹

On March 23, 2007, the French Parliament adopted the final version of a law against marital violence within France. The law also included raising the legal marriage age to 18 years old (from 15) for girls, the same minimum age as for boys in the country, and a provision that makes the rape of a spouse or common-law spouse illegal. On the surface, the law appears benevolent and supportive of women in France. However, the law also places marriage to foreigners under stricter controls. Statistically in France, from 1999 to 2003, the number of French citizens marrying foreigners increased 62 percent, and out of 45,000 marriages, one in three were considered mixed marriages.²⁰² Legislation such as the 2003 headscarf ban, and the March 2007 law tightening marriages to foreigners give Muslims the perception that they are being further discriminated against.

E. THE THREAT: A SENSE OF ALIENATION

As the cleavages within the society grow, the fear of Islamaphobia increases among Frenchmen, while Europhobia increases among immigrants. A recent *Le Parisien* article asked citizens questions on social unrest due to ethnic turmoil. The article reported that 86 percent of those queried feared unrest would break out again, and 82 percent indicated that they had little hope that government efforts to fight high unemployment and racial violence would prove effective.²⁰³

In June 2005, as Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy visited the “sensitive zone” of La Courneuve outside of Paris. While there, he pledged to clean the *racaille*, or scum, off the streets of France with a *Kärcher*, the well-known industrial hose used for street cleaning and graffiti removal. Such comments may create more schisms. As William Safran, a political scientist, wrote in 1986, “Low economic status, the alien

²⁰¹ Giry, 94.

²⁰² Interview with Political Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007. This information was also gleaned from reports provided to the author by this Political Advisor.

²⁰³ Ibid.

culture, and the persistence of racism stimulate Muslim immigrants to turn to their countries of origins and maintain their culture while fully expecting to remain where they are.”²⁰⁴ This is seen by many Frenchmen as a type of double allegiance,²⁰⁵ although the phenomenon may speak more to the bifurcated lives of many French Muslims, who live their own version of the “shopping bag girls” endless costume party.

On the one hand, a recent Pew Survey on global attitudes demonstrated that 91 percent of Muslims in France have a positive view of Christians, while the opposite is true of Muslims in Muslim countries. The same survey found that 93 percent of Muslims in France have little to no confidence in Osama bin Laden; 64 percent believe suicide bombings are never justified, while 16 percent said they are sometimes justified, and 19 percent stated that suicide bombings are rarely justified.²⁰⁶ Against this statistical backdrop, one is hardly surprised to learn that 89 percent of French Muslims see Islamic extremism as threat to their society and way of life.²⁰⁷

On the other hand, there remains the 9 percent of Muslims who hold unfavorable opinions of Christians, the 7 percent who believe in bin Laden, and the 36 percent who think that suicide bombings are justified in certain situations (and will say as much to a pollster). They constitute a small, yet potentially extremely lethal segment part of the social landscape in France. As the European Union’s Centre for Monitoring Xenophobia and Racism stated in a recent report, extremists result from a lack of a sense of belonging, and contemporary European Muslims’ sense of belonging could be eroded, risking alienation. That alienation is the real danger to Western societies, as it may lead to acts of terror.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ William Safran, “Islamization in Western Europe: Political Consequences and Historical Parallels.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 485, From Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities (May 1986), 111.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 104.

²⁰⁶ “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate.” 4.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 24.

²⁰⁸ “Muslim Alienation Risk in Europe.” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6189675.stm> (accessed January 11, 2007).

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V. THE CONCLUSION OR JUST THE BEGINNING?

In France, a day spent in the concrete corridors of Mantes-la-Jolie illustrates the combustible mix of unemployment and despair, prejudice and lack of identity that makes Europe's Muslim Ghettos a likely target for Islamic extremists wishing to recruit for their cause.²⁰⁹

Terrorism has become the topic *du jour* in circles of media and scholarship. In recent years, the word "Muslim" has become synonymous with terror in the daily lexica of France and other Western societies. However, this thesis demonstrates that terrorism is not a spontaneous or stand-alone problem. Terror and other forms of extremism in France—whether imminent or imagined—mark an end form of the true issue: social exclusion, or alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society's republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity make no distinction for such identity factors as ethnicity and religion. For the (as yet) majority French, the universalism of the Revolution's programmatic slogan coexists in the French national self-image with peculiarly French ways of affecting these liberal-democratic ideals. The circle is harder to square for France's Muslims. On the one hand, *La Grande Nation* aspires to embody the universal values rooted in the Revolution and the Enlightenment, particularly where relations between citizen and state are concerned. On the other hand, this French identity clashes with Muslim cultures and conventions at levels that are fundamental to both. Stuck in between is France's Muslim minority—along with France's cherished aspirations for integration and, indeed, Frenchness.

To be sure, the French ideals have plenty of life left in them. The November 2005 riots throughout France were characterized as a Muslim uprising in much Western media looking to document the pending "culture war" of academic rumor. A closer examination of the rioters' signs and chants shows that they never called for such extremist institutions

²⁰⁹ Elizabeth Neuffer, "Islamaphobia in Europe Fuels Tensions." *Boston Globe*. (June 20, 1995), from Lexus/Nexus.

as *jihad*, *sharia*, or a *caliphate*. Instead, posters demanded only employment, justice, equality, and civil rights—an entirely French call to action.²¹⁰

To this end, some Frenchmen, including President Sarkozy, believe affirmative action policies have merit as a means of lessening socio-economic gaps and the attendant pressures on the French polity. However, many in France cling to their Republican values and reject these programs as racist. Increasingly, even die-hard French Republicanism is finding something to like in *discrimination positive*, as long as such a program is based solely on economic considerations, without taking race or religion into account.

At the same time, Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi, argues that the Europeanization of Islam—or, on the individual level, the proper integration of Muslims into European society—is both desirable and possible. Tibi writes that leaders within the religious community must inform their members that they can and should participate in the secular duties of good citizens and neighbors. He goes on to compare the history of both Jews and Protestants, once discrete minorities who eventually embraced their host societies, or at least agreed to participate in the politics—and the modernity—of the majority culture without necessarily abandoning the requirements of their respective faiths.²¹¹ Muslim leaders in contemporary Europe might look toward the *Haskalah*, or Jewish Enlightenment in Europe of the 1770s through the 1880s, in which the European Jewry sought to integrate themselves into their European host society in dress, language, and

²¹⁰ Interview by author with a senior member of Defense Attaché Office, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007. Interviews and documents from a Political Advisor in the U.S. Embassy in Paris also demonstrated this to the author. Additionally these also highlighted that despite the rhetoric of many in the society, these demands for justice were not lost on French leadership. In February 2007, a high-ranking member of the French Ministry for Equal Opportunity discussed the festering problem of the lack of opportunity for France's immigrant poor. He stated that he believed that France is facing "an emergency" with regard to its underclass population. He pointed to the need for economic dynamism, job creation, and diminished ethnic prejudice. He also criticized the "street culture" of young urban males. He highlighted that the problem stems from the inhabitants' sense of exclusion, not from religious zeal. These ideas are echoed in some halls of the French government. As Minister of Interior, President Nicholas Sarkozy stated that France should consider using some form of affirmative action program to redress racial and ethnic inequality.

²¹¹ Bassam Tibi, "Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: Political democracy vs. Cultural difference." In *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein, eds., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

loyalty. Ideas such as Moses Mendelssohn's "be a man outside and a Jew at home" demonstrate that one does not have to forgo religious beliefs for societal acceptance.²¹²

A. TERROR—PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY

This study has highlighted statistical data and recent legislation that focus on perceptions. In particular, rising Islamophobia²¹³ in Western cultures fosters a perception of Muslims as Islamic extremists, while Europhobia among Muslims is fueled by perceptions of racism and alienation. The upshot is mutual misunderstanding at least—and extremism and terror at worst. These risks are clearly associated with social cleavage.

In his prescient article in 1986, William Safran explained that Muslims in France develop a greater identification with Islam for three major reasons. First, he states that Muslims identify with Islam more as it implies a membership in a large and influential community. Second, when they are not accepted in French society, French Muslims step up their observation (or orthodoxy) because they believe Islam gives them a sense of purpose. Lastly, Islam provides a form of psychological security to believers,²¹⁴ as is evident in the aforementioned underground Muslim school of Lille or even the daily situation of "shopping bag girls" who seek that psychological security, or a preservation of a cultural identity as they change their identity with the removal or addition of a *hijab*.

²¹² For more information on the *maskilim*, or followers of the *Haskalah*, see Shira Schoenberg's article "The Haskalah" in The Jewish Virtual Library. Available at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Judaism/Haskalah.html> (accessed May 24, 2007).

²¹³ One of the central tenets to Islamophobia is the perception of a rapidly rising Muslim population with the host country. This increase in Muslims is a factor of many things to include immigration rates, birthrates, and conversion to Islam. Immigration rates, to include mixed marriage and family reunification, in most Western countries to include the U.S. and France have significantly decreased in recent years due to more stringent controls. Birthrates, often highlighted as the most significant sign of growth, are not a factor of Islam versus Christianity, which is underscored by many authors, but more a factor of social class and levels of aid available to families within various societies. Birthrates are touted by authors such as Bruce Bawer, Claire Berlinski, and Melanie Phillips as significant threats; however, scholars such as Zachary Shore, Jonathon Laurence, and Jocelyn Cesari demonstrate that throughout history reproduction rates in immigrant communities are less a factor of religion than of affluence, and these rates have decreased in accordance with an increased social status. Conversion to Islam is a relatively small number in comparison to the aforementioned categories; however, it is the adherence to the Muslim faith, or the extreme adherence to it that raises concern.

²¹⁴ William Safran, "Islamization in Western Europe: Political Consequences and Historical Parallels." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 485, From Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities (May, 1986), 104.

If Safran is correct, then an alienated Muslim, immigrant or citizen, in France becomes “more” Muslim as a result of his perception of alienation within his host society.

When this author visited the Grand Mosque of Paris in April 2007, one of the foremost questions asked of the Muslim interlocutors was what they thought of the secularization or Europeanization of Islam. Each of the seven Muslims with whom this interviewer spoke that afternoon stated that they were French and believed that their religion was not in conflict with their country or its government. These men touted the ideas of the Republic. To a man, however, they all insisted that their government has failed them, especially in anti-discrimination measures. Each affirmed that he had no anger for France, but they all sense that Islam is under attack. They believe their white neighbors harbor fear and distrust of Muslims. They further described what they see as ubiquitous social and religious discrimination. Young and old Muslims alike repeatedly accentuated their poor employment opportunities, bad schools, and unfair representation in government.²¹⁵ When asked what led Muslims to support terror, whether ideologically or literally, these men all stated that they believed that their Muslim brothers were easy “prey” for radicals, as these Islamists are able to use religious association to convince despondent, disenchanted, and unemployed Muslims both in Europe as well as in French society.²¹⁶

The discussion of the creation of a terrorist, or the support to terrorists, begs the question of how many exist in a given society. According to Timothy Savage in his article on Europe and Islam in 2004, Europe’s Counterterrorism officials estimate that 1 percent to 2 percent of the continent’s Muslims—or a total of 250,000 to 500,000 people—are involved in some type of extremist activity.²¹⁷ The distinction between extremism and terrorism is important here; these officials also stated that they are unclear

²¹⁵ Interview with by author Parisian Muslims at Grande Mosque de Paris, April 5, 2007.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ This statistic does not articulate a level or type of participation. A reader may see 1-2 percent as a small portion; however, this author has included the raw figure of 250-500,000 in order to illuminate that this relatively “small” number might be incredibly dangerous and lethal if using modern technology to incite terror.

as to how many Muslims on the continent would support terror.²¹⁸ Savage goes on to describe the men of the September 11 attacks on the United States as “examples of immigrants whose ideas were radically transformed in Europe. According to French experts, only a minority of European Islamist terrorists had been passionate fanatics in their Muslim home countries prior to coming to Europe. ... Few return home to fight. ... They take up jihad in other places.”²¹⁹

French scholar of Islam Olivier Roy stated that the Muslims who become terrorists follow the pattern of European extremists from the 1970s and 1980s. Roy believes that modern-day Muslim terrorists, like the members of Germany’s *Rote Armee Faktion*, Italy’s *Brigatta Rosso*, and France’s *Action Directe*, are comprised of cells of disaffected, European-educated (with university or technical degrees) males who share a common, marginal culture.²²⁰

French Counterterrorism Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière stated that radicalization is an enormous risk. But the greater hazard comes with the departure of radicals to receive training and experience fighting abroad before their return to France, where they would become both highly lethal and extremely influential among other disaffected Muslims. Bruguière stated that France’s “chief concern is to stop the flow of European Muslims into and out of Iraq, where they get hands-on training in weapons and terrorist tactics.”²²¹

The preponderance of Muslim terror today is committed by groups of Muslims gathered in social networks. As the former Foreign Service Officer and Middle East scholar Marc Sageman showed, using social network analysis of centralized and decentralized terror organizations, terrorist acts very often stem from a group of friends who collude to commit terror after developing a collective sense of isolation and/or social exclusion. He specifically highlights first and second generation Northern African Arabs

²¹⁸ Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), 31.

²¹⁹ Savage, 34.

²²⁰ The French social scientist, Olivier Roy, is one of the leading voices in modern discourse on Islam and Europe. His *The Failure of Political Islam* is renowned as are his countless articles on the subject.

²²¹ Interview by National War College students of Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, May 12, 2006.

in France, who formed networks and “sought friendships [acceptance] in local mosques.”²²² According to Sageman, global *jihad* “gave them both a cause and comrades.”²²³

Officials in the French anti-terrorism directorate echoed Sageman’s findings. These officials said that Muslim Frenchmen join radical groups for three major reasons: humiliation by proxy, due to events in the Middle East; personal humiliation in the West, from discrimination, etc.; a lack of assimilation in the West, leaving them without a group identity except for that provided by radical groups.²²⁴ This view was shared by a spokesperson for the French General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) who also provided three catalysts: the failures of political Islam to achieve goals for Muslims; personal humiliation at the hands of security services, a result of racism or discrimination; or humiliation by proxy from events in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine.²²⁵

B. BROADER IMPLICATIONS

The terrorist issue forms a vicious circle. A largely unreflective fear of extremist violence confirms to Frenchmen that Muslims in France pose a physical threat to the state and the nation, and the French look to the law, as well as myriad social practices, to enforce order—and, distantly, Frenchness. In turn, this response reinforces for Muslims the prevalence of French racism, which further isolates the French Muslims and sows more disenchantment. From these circumstances, fears of terrorism may be answered with terrorist acts. Although the 2003 headscarf ban, so far, seems to have had relatively little direct impact on the functioning of schools, some 1200 to 2000 Muslim girls desire to continue to wear their *hijabs*. This minority is important, because just as hate crimes

²²² Sageman continues that, these Muslims “became particularly lonely and emotionally alienated in this new individualist environment...They sought a cause that would give them emotional relief, social community, spiritual comfort, and cause for self-sacrifice.”

²²³ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 96-97.

²²⁴ Interview by National War College students of official at the French National Anti-Terrorism Unit (UCLAT), Ministry of the Interior, May 9, 2006.

²²⁵ Interview by National War College students of official at the Office of the General Secretariat for National Defense, May 12, 2006.

and murders have been sensationalized by the Western media, the plight of these girls is and can continue to be sensationalized by the Pan-Islamists.²²⁶

France, and indeed the European Union must take steps now to promote future research. They must learn from the successes and failures of immigration reforms in other Western countries, as well as reviewing standards and techniques for integration of immigrant populations. The development of policies and restrictions that facilitate further integration are key to social collusion and peace. More broadly, the immature governing body of the new, united Europe must address such policies as the place of religion in public life, social tolerance in Europe, and secularism as the only path to modernity and European identity. The Europeans, in general, and the French, in particular, must come to terms with their pride and patriotism—and identify what is truly racism. Understanding and adapting the collective *habitus* is vital to the European past and present.²²⁷

In the French case, as Eugen Weber wrote, “Revolution had brought with it the concept of national unity as an integral and integrating ideal at all levels, and the ideal of oneness stirred concern about its shortcomings. Diversity became imperfection, injustice, failure, something to be noted and something to be remedied.”²²⁸ Rethinking what it means to be French must not, and can no longer be avoided. As a nation, France has been and continues to be transformed through its membership in the E.U., as well as through immigration, globalization, domestic politics, and various other cultural, social,

²²⁶ Evan Williams, “France-Headscarfed.” <http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1106690.htm> (accessed November 23, 2006).

²²⁷ *Habitus*, a term coined by Pierre Bourdieu in the field of International Relations Theory, is the practice of socialization aimed at “fashioning rational subjects” whereby persons learn a body of knowledge that shapes their ethos and values. (Pierre Bourdieu is the author of countless works; however, *habitus* is particularly center in his work *Outline of Theory in Practice*.) States and organizations have historically used various methods of coercion and/or persuasion to alter subjects’ or citizens’ *habitus*. As Stefano Guzzini highlighted in his work *A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations*, “[*Habitus*] guarantees the active presence of past experiences through providing schemas of perception, thought, and action which tend to reproduce practices in conformity with the field throughout time. *Habitus* functions like the materialization of collective memory.”

²²⁸ Weber, 9.

and political phenomena that transcend borders.²²⁹ The French government must again inculcate its citizens with the values of liberal democracy—updated, if necessary, to accommodate a more diverse citizenry.

1. Politics

The contemporary political landscape in France consists of various Muslim organizations that purport to represent Muslims. However, many Muslims believe these bodies are largely invalid due to the various ethnic and religious differences amongst Muslims in France.²³⁰ Oftentimes local or regional issues overcome key national issues as these different groups identify with the country of origin of their members.²³¹ The most prominent national organization is the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM), which encompasses most of the mufti in Paris and Marseille. The CFCM is a creation of the French government, however; as such, it is well received by non-Muslims, but not yet accepted by the Muslim community.²³²

Another central, national-level organization is the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (UOIF), which, as a subgroup of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, has many links with Arab governments. Often this organization negotiates with the French government in accordance with the position of those governments rather than the Muslims it claims to represent.²³³ Throughout the country, other Muslim organizations exist, but these groups are not aligned *per se* with the French government for the discussion or negotiation of issues. The two most prominent are the *Participation de Culte Musulman* (PCM), which focuses on spiritual aspects of Islam and political mobilization on such key issues as racism and sexism; and the *Conseil*

²²⁹ Dominic Thomas, *Black France: Colonialism, Immigration, and Transnationalism*. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 9.

²³⁰ Just as there is no unified Muslim community in France due to numerous cultural and religious divides, many Muslims highlight the problem of the various representational bodies and their allegiances to a religious sect and/or country of origin.

²³¹ Interview by National War College students of Muslim official at the Office of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 12, 2006.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ The UOIF is a broad organization with no true consensus on major issues.

Musulman de France (CMF), which allegedly is closely linked to the Swiss scholar, Tariq Ramadan, who openly advocates the reinterpretation of the Koran and the idea of a “Euro-Islam.”²³⁴

Many of the Muslims in France believe their politicians pander to the sense of a “greater” Muslim world on issues within the Hexagon that affect their daily life. As these politicians cater to the “Muslim factor,” or finding commonality in political opinion, in international politics rather than focusing on their growing constituency of Muslims, they continue to avoid addressing domestic strife.²³⁵ Additionally, Timothy Savage points out that European politicians perpetuate this type of “stability strategy” by failing to undertake any policy change that might affect the seeming stability in Muslim neighborhoods. (By seeming stability, that is to say, that the avoidance of addressing domestic issues and relegating Muslims to their *banlieues*, perpetuates their exclusion from the polity. This relative stability, which includes the ever-increasing domestic violence, only remains so long as disenchanted Muslims remain relatively non-violent and find solace in their politicians’ attempts to find commonality on international issues.) These politicians and governments have “sought to prop up regimes in order to” placate Muslim Europeans and also to “slow immigration flow and/or quarantine Islamic fundamental contagion.”²³⁶

This notional stability might prove very short-lived if change is not forthcoming. Political change must occur within the French and European systems that includes and properly represents Muslims, of all types, within the polity. The “one size fits all” approach that many French and European politicians have utilized has failed to represent

²³⁴ Interview with by author Political Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007. This information was also gleaned from reports provided to the author by this Political Advisor.

²³⁵ This fact is both due to the influx of electronic and modern media from throughout the Muslim world and the perception of a “greater” Muslim community. Savage points out that unlike the U.S., Europe has many Muslim neighboring countries, and the real ties and perceptions of these Muslim immigrants of their countries of origin and other Muslim countries leads Muslim voters in Europe to often be more energized on issues of foreign policy than on domestic employment and education.

²³⁶ Savage, 38-40.

or even understand properly the “variety and diversity of Muslim communities, sectarian differences, non-hierarchical nature of Islam, and other structural and functional differences from Christian religions.”²³⁷

That is not to say that the onus lies solely on the continental Europeans. Muslims within France and greater Europe must voice their concerns as citizens, not extremists. First, they must, as Bassam Tibi writes, render their religion compatible, as did the aforementioned Jewry of the *Haskalah* more than a century ago, with the society with which they have entered.

Also, as voters within the French democracy, the growing Muslim constituency can influence both international *and* domestic policy. For example, a group of approximately twenty representatives from the infamous Clichy-Sous-Bois district outside Paris (infamous for the November 2005 riots) met with presidential candidate, Ségolène Royale, in February of 2007, to highlight their views from this *zone sensible*. These representatives emphasized their desire to pass a “citizens social charter” to French elites, stating that the “message of the riots of 2005 hasn’t been heard.”²³⁸ Their social charter was uniquely Republican in that it demanded no special consideration for Muslims or immigrants as such; they called only for liberty, equality, and fraternity. Collective Muslim voices politically organized as this was, may continue to receive audience with French politicians, such as President Sarkozy.

2. Racism

The experience of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States may provide insight to future, French and even European Union initiatives to reduce racism in the

²³⁷ Savage, 41.

²³⁸ Interview by author with Political Advisor, U.S. Embassy, Paris, April 4, 2007. This information was also gleaned from reports provided to the author by this Political Advisor.

polity.²³⁹ Just as U.S. courts affected change when legislatures lagged behind social change, French and European courts can also codify laws to similar ends. First, these courts must continue to create laws and demand the enforcement of equal opportunity legislation, as is their judicial responsibility. These courts must maintain the view of the greater law of universal values, as was evident in the U.S. decisions, the key aspect of citizenship for all members of the society is the true acquisition of rights, and the enforcement of these rights. The second key requirement is for the state to enforce these rights and that citizens have a vehicle for the addressing of their grievances. Black Americans used those rights to achieve true legal equality in the American Civil Rights Movement. All Europeans, of all races, must become a true part of the polity, thus receiving rights, services, etc.

The year 2007 was designated “European Year of Equal Opportunities for All.” Two European Community Directives—the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Framework Directive—define a set of principles that offer everyone in the E.U. a common minimum level of protection against discrimination.²⁴⁰ However, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia stated in a recent report that “Muslims like other religious group remain inadequately recorded statistically, and more research is essential to record attitudes and the extent of victimization; Muslims are often the victims of negative stereotyping; Muslims, particularly young people, face limited opportunities for social advancement which could give rise to hopelessness and alienation; and data shows most Muslims are disproportionately represented in areas with

²³⁹ Black Americans achieved civil rights in the United States by means of both legislative and judicial measures. The 1964/65 Voting Rights Act followed by the judicial support of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, which led to desegregation in schools, facilitated the entry of Blacks into American schools, as well as the eventual social mobility that improved education enabled. Key to both of these decisions was that Blacks had access to courts and representation. That access coupled with legal rights was crucial to sweeping systemic change. Europeans have initiated legislative reforms that ensure civil rights. (Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 and Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000. Both are results of Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty which reads: “[T]he Council ... may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”) However, the enforcement of such rights is the next step toward the reduction and eventual eradication of racism within society, as the U.S. experience makes clear.

²⁴⁰ “Discrimination in the European Union.” Special Eurobarometer 263/Wave 65.4-TNS Opinion and Social, January 2007. The details of these laws are found in the above Footnote.

poor housing conditions and their educational achievement falls below average.”²⁴¹ Europeans must make significant changes in this “year of equality” to promote that the parity proclaimed by their own founding documentation and fondest political habits of thought. Such measures might also make the world safer.

C. GENERAL CONCLUSION

As a terrorism expert noted in a recent *Economist* article, “Terrorism is not on the run, it is on the march.”²⁴² The collusion of the GSPC, which had proclaimed France as its primary enemy, with al-Qaeda may be an attempt to develop a fifth-column inside Europe among the North African Muslim population in Europe. Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently proclaimed that the new al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or the area in the northwest of Africa, would “be a thorn in the necks of the American and French crusaders and their allies.”²⁴³

Despite the Islamophobic ideas that spur the extreme right parties in France and elsewhere in Europe, one of the crucial arenas of immigrant integration will continue to be the basic community. Representation of all peoples at all levels of democracy facilitates trust and understanding, which eventually leads to mutual acceptance. As Rachid Hamoudi, the director of the Lille Mosque stated, “We must tell youths that France doesn’t want to hold them down... . We must ensure that the community trusts its country, and vice-versa. If you get to know me, you will get to trust me. If I get to know you, I will trust you.”²⁴⁴ Bassam Tibi argues that Muslims must adapt themselves to a “new European context marked by different values.”²⁴⁵ At the same time, traditional Europeans must move beyond fears of cultural differences and learn to trust their not-so-new neighbors. Tibi wrote that Europeans, also, must focus on their secularism, but also

²⁴¹ “Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia.” European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006, 7-8.

²⁴² “On the March, not on the run.” *The Economist*, January 20, 2007, 69-70.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ “Ghettos shackle French Muslims.” <http://newsvote.bbc.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4375910.stm> (accessed November 21, 2006).

²⁴⁵ Tibi, “Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe.”

their liberal rights. As the author Timothy Garton Ash wrote, “if we—for want of a better word—traditional Europeans, manage to reverse the current trend, and enable people ... to feel at home as European Muslims, they could be a source of cultural enrichment and economic dynamism, helping to compensate for the downward drag of Europe’s rapidly aging population. If we fail, we shall face many more explosions.” This author concurs with Mr. Ash. Any failure to promote integration will lead to more explosions, whether they be political, interpersonal, social, or, worst of all, literal. The well-known French maxim “*A la revolution il faut du sang*,”²⁴⁶ proclaims that blood is necessary for a revolution. Ensuring that a literalist program based on this slogan does not develop among Muslim immigrants is the key to the future of French, and potentially Western peace and security.

As the Pew Global Attitudes survey highlighted, “The problem lies neither with your average Muslim or your average Westerner, but with extremists.”²⁴⁷ To curtail the “creation” of extremists or their relative ease in recruiting literal, material, or ideological support is to undo an environment of social exclusion. Despite the rising Islamaphobia in European minds and the sense of exclusion among French Muslims and immigrants, the most common ideas are those expressed by Nour-eddine Skiker, a youth worker near Paris. The young Frenchman of Moroccan descent proclaimed, “I feel completely French. I will do everything for this country, which is mine.”²⁴⁸ The true problem lies not in how youth like Mr. Skiker feel, but more so how his French countrymen feel about these “other” or “darker” Frenchmen. Nadir Dendoune stated, “How am I supposed to feel French when people always describe me as a Frenchman of Algerian origin? I was born here. I am French. How many generations does it take to stop mentioning my origin?”²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Richard Cobb, *The French and their Revolution*. (London: John Murray, 1998).

²⁴⁷ “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate:”

²⁴⁸ “Ghettos shackle French Muslims.” [http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4375910.stm](http://newsvote.bbc.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4375910.stm) (accessed November 21, 2006).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

As Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall highlight in their work, *The Color of Liberty*, this author also means “to emphasize how the Islamic and/or African presence in France—while of course having altered the demographic and cultural identities—should by no means be understood as a threat to ‘Frenchness’ but rather should, alongside other immigrant experiences, emerge as constitutive Hexagonal and European identity. ... [French and European elites and Islamaphobes must] let go of reductive and misinformed monolithic and unilinear historical narratives.”²⁵⁰ As Bruce Hoffman writes, “In the final analysis, it must be recognized that there is no single, universal solution to the problem of terrorism—be it either the domestic or international variant. Yet, this fact only reinforces the need for multiple creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least to control the growth of terrorism and contain its violent manifestations.”²⁵¹ Europeans promoting and embracing diversity while reducing alienation and exclusion, and the perceptions of isolating factors, coupled with Muslim integration and secularization, may be the most productive and effective methods to counter terror and those who espouse it. It is certainly the essence of Frenchness.

²⁵⁰ Peabody and Stovall, 211.

²⁵¹ Bruce Hoffman, “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?” *Foreign Policy*, No. 115 (Summer 1999), 75-76.

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